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“Turning a mosquito into an elephant”, is the Dutch 
equivalent of the English proverb “turning a molehill 
into a mountain”. The proverb is a metaphor for the 
common behavior of responding disproportionately 
to something - usually an adverse circumstance. 
CHAPTEr 1
GENErAl INTrODuCTION AND OuTlINE Of THE THESIS
Imagine that you woke up this morning, got out of bed and, when trying to get to the 
bathroom, you hit your toe hard to the bed leg. What would go through your head? 
In circumstances like the ones described above, for many people, it is not uncommon 
to have thoughts like the following: “This will be the worst day ever! Again!”, “Why 
do they always make beds with legs on such awkward places?”, “Why do these 
things always happen to me?”, “I cannot even get out of my bed in a proper way! I 
cannot do anything right!” etc. This type of cognitive behavior is usually referred to 
as overgeneralization.
 Overgeneralization is defined by Beck (1976) as “unjustified generalization on 
the basis of a single incident” (p.94). It is a prominent concept in several theories of 
personality and depression. Overgeneralization predicted the development of 
depressive symptoms in a longitudinal research design (Carver, 1998; Dykman, 
1996) and led to slower recovery from dysphoric mood states (Edelman, Ahrens & 
Haaga, 1994). Recently, experimental studies have found evidence that overgeneral 
thinking is a cognitive bias that causally contributes to depressive symptoms 
(Watkins & Moberly, 2009; Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009).
 As may be clear form the example above, overgeneralization is observed in the 
behavior of all people. In clinical practice, especially negative overgeneralization 
seems to be more prominent in the cognitive behavior of individuals suffering from 
emotional disorders. For example, a man suffering from a major depression, told 
me that when he failed to reach one deadline at work, he was convinced he was 
unsuitable for the job and it would be just a matter of time before he would get 
fired. Another example was provided by a young woman suffering from borderline 
personality disorder I was to see for an intake interview. She had disappeared from 
the waiting room, when I came to collect her ten minutes late, despite the fact that 
the secretary had passed the message to her I was late due to an unexpected crisis 
situation I had to attend to in the clinic. When I called her to apologize for my 
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lateness and asked her what had happened, she told me that from my being late 
this first interview, she was convinced I would never be dedicated enough to her 
and abandon her anyway.
Three different approaches to overgeneralization
Although the implication of overgeneralization in the onset and maintenance of 
psychopathology is generally accepted, different hypotheses have been formulated 
with respect to what the concept represents, how it functions and how it is 
associated to psychological distress. 
A first approach to understand the concept of overgeneralization is to look at the 
association of overgeneralization to (extreme) low levels of self-esteem. In 
psychodynamic views, for example, it has been suggested that overgeneralization 
is caused by the particularly hyperactive or punishing superegos of those prone to 
depression (Jacobson, 1975). According to this view, individuals with a vulnerability 
to depression are unable to neutralize the “aggressive drive energy” of their 
super-egos causing self-criticism to turn into self-hate. They react to limited specific 
failures with a total rejection of their entire self. As a result, disappointment in a 
given domain will have implications throughout a person’s entire psychic life, rather 
than being limited to that specific domain, thereby making a person vulnerable for 
depression. 
 Roberts and Monroe (1994) describe overgeneralization as a self-esteem 
deflating process that converts self-criticism following specific and limited failures 
or disappointments into a global rejection of the entire self. In a review of 
psychodynamic, cognitive, and social-environmental perspectives, Roberts and 
Monroe propose a multidimensional model of the etiology, maintenance, and 
recovery of depression in which overgeneralization is one of three areas of 
vulnerability that contribute to problems in the regulation of self-esteem, besides 
structural inadequacies, such as limited and overvalued sources of a positive sense 
of self, and  poor consolidation of information about the self, including confusion, 
uncertainty and inconsistency with regard to self-relevant information. 
 Carver (1998) puts forward that overgeneralization must be seen as a breakdown 
of confidence of being able to maintain effective functioning in several aspects of 
life, as a function of failure or disappointment in only one domain. According to 
Carver, this suggests a kind of fragility in the whole sense of self. He proposes that 
it is this fragility or variability of self-esteem rather than the low level of self-esteem 
that makes a person vulnerable to depression (Hayes, Harris, & Carver, 2004) and 
that the overgeneralization tendency is what underlies it. Carver (1998) mentions 
two different possibilities of what is happening when a person overgeneralizes. 
One possibility is that a person who overgeneralizes is someone who has difficulty 
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holding different parts of life separated. He has not elaborated aspects of the self 
into compartmentalized units that stand relatively distinct from each other. When 
a problem occurs in one domain, other domains are infected eliciting negative 
thoughts and associations about those other domains (cf. Linville, 1987 in Carver, 
1998).
 Another possibility is suggested by the model of self-regulation by Carver and 
Scheier (1998). This model treats the self as a hierarchy of goals. According to this 
view, the broad sense of the idealized self is considered a very-high-order goal, 
whereas the concrete goals in most daily activities are considered as low-order. 
Carver (1998) suggests that overgeneralizers are people who are trying to control 
their lives at too high a level of abstraction. So when a person is working on a daily 
task, he is actually working at the goal of maintaining a sense of his idealized self. 
Therefore, when the person experiences a setback at a lower level, he will 
experience this not only as a minor task failure but as a failure of the entire self.
 Numerous studies have provided evidence for the relationship between low 
and variable levels of self-esteem, and depressive symptoms (Beck, Brown, Steer, 
Kuyken, & Grsham, 2001; Butler, Hokanson, and Flynn, 1994; Kernis, Granneman & 
Mathis, 1991; Oosterwegel, Field, Hart, & Anderson, 2004). More recently, Hayes, 
Harris, and Carver (2004) found negative overgeneralization to be associated with 
low self-esteem as well as variable self-esteem, and with depressive symptoms in 
the past. They found associations between a  tendency to overgeneralize and 
decrease of self-esteem on ‘bad’ days (days when adverse events occurred), and 
increase of self-esteem on days when no adverse events occurred, suggesting that 
negative overgeneralization is one of the processes by which negative events are 
associated with fluctuations in the level of self-esteem. 
A second approach to overgeneralization is to look at the association between over-
generalization and high levels of affect intensity. Affect intensity is defined by 
Larsen & Diener (1987) as a general intensity dimension in the affective reactions of 
individuals leading to “stable individual differences in the strength with which 
individuals experience their emotions”. High affect intensity is associated with a 
number of emotional disorders (e.g., Dizen, 2006; Flett, Blankstein & Obertynski, 
1995) and individuals with high affect intensity tend to experience greater 
psychological distress (Levine, Marziali, & Hood, 1997; Yen, Zlotnick, & Costello, 
2002).  Individual differences in affect intensity have been found to correlate with 
the tendency to overgeneralize (Larsen, Billings, & Cutler, 1996; Larsen, Diener, & 
Cropanzano, 1987; Dritschel & Teasdale, 1991). Again, different theories about the 
nature of the relations between overgeneralization, psychological distress, and 
affect intensity provide competing hypotheses. First, Larsen (2000) in his control 
theory of mood regulation, describes how individuals with trait high affect intensity 
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are more likely to engage in mood intensifying cognitive behavior (such as overgen-
eralization) when in a state of under-arousal, thus making them more vulnerable to 
psychological distress. In line with this theory, overgeneralization mediates the 
relation between affect intensity and psychological distress. Second, Larsen, 
Billings, & Cutler (1996) suggest in their model of informational style that overgen-
eralization leads individuals to interpret affective stimuli in a manner that intensifies 
the affective response to those stimuli. This in turn results in high affect intensity, 
which makes them more susceptible to psychological distress. So here, affect 
intensity mediates the relation between overgeneralization and psychological 
distress.  
A third approach to the explanation of overgeneralization is that it represents a 
distortion in the processing of information. Different authors have provided 
different theories about how overgeneralization distorts information processing 
and why this leads to depressive mood states. According to the cognitive distortion 
view of depression, originally set forth by Beck (1967, 1976), depressed people are 
distinguished from non-depressed not only by the negative contents of their 
thoughts, but also by the inadequacy of their inferential processes. Information 
processing refers to the way a person filters and structures environmental input 
(i.e., what information gains attention, enters memory, and can be recalled) and is 
believed to be guided by underlying cognitive structures. So, the cognitive distortion 
view by Beck assumes that information processing in individuals suffering from 
depression is not only guided by the content of their negative schemata but also by 
their reasoning faults (i.e., their cognitive distortions). Beck et al. (1979) identified 
overgeneralization, selective abstraction, mental filter, arbitrary inference, person-
alization and dichotomous thinking as the major thinking distortions characterizing 
depressives’ thought. Of these various cognitive biases overgeneralization was 
identified as the most reliable cognitive indicator of depression (e.g., Carver, 1998; 
Carver et al., 1985; Ganellen, 1988). 
 The reformulated learned helplessness theory (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 
1978), assumes that a person experiences depressed affect as a consequence of 
learning that the outcome of a given situation is uncontrollable. A person feels 
helpless because a given situation is not contingent on any response in his 
repertoire. When a person finds that he is helpless, he asks why he is helpless. The 
causal attribution he makes then, determines the generality and chronicity of his 
helplessness deficits as well as his later self-esteem. The intensity of self-esteem 
loss and affective changes will increase with both the certainty and importance of 
the event the person is helpless about. In addition, a person will expect to be 
helpless in the immediate and distant future, dependable on the extent in which his 
attribution is global or stable. Inappropriate broad generalization of the expectation 
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of incontingency (i.e., overgeneralization) will occur when subjects attribute their 
helplessness to global and stable factors.  An attributional style characteristic to 
depressive individuals was found to involve internal, stable, and global attributions 
about negative life events (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). These negative, 
self-deprecating attributions are hypothesized to interact with negative life events, 
thus contributing to the onset and maintenance of the depressive syndrome. 
 According to hopelessness theory (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989) depression 
can be caused by generalized hopelessness. Generalized hopelessness occurs when 
people expect negative outcomes, and experience helplessness about changing the 
likelihood of the occurrence of these outcomes in many areas of life. Generalized 
hopelessness is more likely to occur when negative life events are attributed to 
stable and global causes (i.e. overgeneralization), and are viewed as important. 
According to this theory there are three types of inferences people may make that 
modulate whether they become hopeless and, in turn, develop the symptoms of 
hopelessness: inferences about why the event occurred, inferences about the 
consequences that will result from it, and inferences about the self. In contrast to 
helplessness theory, the internality dimension of causal attributions is less 
emphasized. Where other theories, like Brown and Harris’s social origins of 
depression (1978) emphasize low self-esteem as the diathesis for depressive 
symptoms, hopelessness theory explicitly emphasizes negative cognitive styles as 
the diathesis. In hopelessness theory, low self-esteem is seen as a symptom rather 
than a cause of depression.
 Watkins and colleagues see overgeneralization together with other cognitive 
processes such as overgeneral memories (see Williams et al., 2007) and depressive 
rumination as forms of abstract-overgeneral processing which are strongly 
implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression (Watkins, 2008; Watkins, 
Baeyens, & Read, 2009; Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008). First, depression is 
characterized by an increased tendency toward overgeneralization, in which a 
general rule or conclusion is drawn on the basis of isolated incidents and applied 
across the board to related and unrelated situations. Second, depression is 
characterized by increased recall of overgeneral memories, characterized by 
categoric summaries of repeated events. A third cognitive process implicated in the 
onset and maintenance of depression is rumination. The ruminative response style 
is conceived as a pattern of behaviors and thoughts that focus the individual’s 
attention on his or her emotional state and inhibit any actions that might distract 
the individual from his or her mood. Rumination is characterized by an abstract, 
evaluative style of processing that involves recurrent thinking about the causes, 
meanings and implications of depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
Watkins and Moberly (2009) argue that, in line with overgeneral memory and 
rumination,  the notion of overgeneralization parallels the concept of abstract 
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construals within the social-cognitive literature. Abstract construals are general, 
abstract, decontextualized mental representations that refer to the essential 
meaning of events and actions, such as inferences of global traits that are invariant 
across different situations (e.g. “cowardice”) or representations about the causes, 
meanings and implications of situations (the “why” of a situation). In contrast, 
concrete construals are more concrete mental representations that refer to 
secondary , contextual, and situation-specific states, such as “panic”, or represen-
tations about “how” events happened. 
 In sum, the evidence that overgeneralization is associated with vulnerability to 
depression is impressive. However, many questions remain unanswered. The three 
approaches described above provide overlapping but also contradictory hypotheses 
about the occurrence and workings of overgeneralization. The aim of the present 
dissertation is to evaluate and refine some of these hypotheses. 
OuTlINE Of THE THESIS
Testing the conceptualization, delimitation and occurrence of the overgeneralization 
concept (Chapter 2)
 Several authors have claimed that overgeneralization is specific to depression 
(Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Carver, Lavoie, Kuhl, & Ganellen, 1988; Ganellen, 1988) 
and frequently these statements are quoted as facts (p.a., Watkins, Baeyens, & 
Raed, 2009). However, to our knowledge, almost all findings on overgeneralization 
are from studies with non-clinical samples and only Carver, Lavoie, Kuhl, & Ganellen 
(1988) and Fennell and Campbell (1984) examined overgeneralization in patients 
who are clinically depressed. And, more recently, other studies have reported 
significant correlations between negative overgeneralization and other 
psychological disorders such as anxiety disorders (Epkins, 1996; Weems, Berman, 
Silverman & Saavedra, 2001), bulimia (Dritschel, Williams & Cooper, 1991), suicide 
ideation (Prezant & Neimeyer, 1988), and marital violence (Eckhardt & Kassinove, 
1998). In Chapter 2 the question is investigated whether overgeneralization is 
uniquely associated to depression, and whether these findings can be generalized 
to clinical populations. 
 Furthermore, in Chapter 2, some major issues regarding the definition or con-
ceptualization of overgeneralization are tested. Epstein (1992) and Carver and 
Ganellen (1983) have argued that it is important to distinguish between two ways of 
defining and measuring overgeneralization. One is the presence of unrealistically 
broad attributions about the self (“overgeneralization to the self”, e.g., “When even 
one thing goes wrong, I begin to feel bad and wonder if I can do well at anything at 
all.”). The other is the presence of overly broad attributions in response to specific 
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situations (“overgeneralization across situations”, e.g., “After I once got stuck in an 
elevator, I considered every elevator as dangerous so I never took one again.”). 
Some researchers assume that the two types of overgeneralization are related, 
with the reactive overgeneralization across situations following negative events 
tending to sustain a relatively stable trait of low self-esteem (e.g. Carver, Ganellen 
& Behar-Mitrani, 1985; Kernis, Brockner & Frankel, 1989). MacLeod & Williams 
(1990), however, stressed the heterogeneity of the overgeneralization-concept on 
the basis of a study, in which they found no significant correlation between two 
overgeneralization-scales, representing the two definitions. This leads to the 
question whether overgeneralizations are uniquely directed at the self or whether 
they affect other areas as well.
 A third question that was investigated in Chapter 2, was whether overgeneral-
ization is restricted to negative content. Investigations of overgeneralization have 
focused predominantly on negative overgeneralization (e.g. Carver, 1998; Carver & 
Ganellen, 1983; Flett, Hewitt & Mittelstaedt, 1991; Klar, Gabai & Baron, 1997; Prezant 
& Neimeyer, 1988; Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). Therefore, it cannot be determined 
whether overgeneralization is restricted to negative attributions, or whether it also 
extends to positive attributions. This focus on negative content makes it hard to 
separate the effect of the content from the effect of the inferential process. 
Investigation of how individual differences in the tendency to overgeneralize lead to 
differences in the level of psychological distress (Chapter 3)
 After having dissected the concept of overgeneralization and having provided 
new evidence in favor of the relevance of the overgeneralization concept for the 
understanding of psychological distress in different clinical populations, a next 
important step was to try and understand how individual differences in the 
tendency to overgeneralize lead to differences in the level of depression or other 
psychological disorders. Earlier findings (e.g., Larsen, 1989; Roberts & Monroe, 
1994) suggest that (1) both affect intensity and low self-esteem are associated to 
overgeneralization; (2) the intensity of affect and level of self-esteem respectively, 
are distinct constructs with differential outcomes; and (3) both affect intensity and 
low self-esteem are associated to psychological distress. However, it still remains 
unclear, how these concepts relate to each other. Does overgeneralization mediate 
the relation between level of self-esteem and affect intensity on the one side and 
psychological distress on the other? Or, is the relation between overgeneralization 
and psychological distress mediated by level of self-esteem and affect intensity? 
According to suggestions made by Beck (1976), Larsen (2000) and Linehan (1993a), 
affect intensity and low self-esteem have an indirect effect on psychological 
distress through overgeneralization. On the other side, according to suggestions 
made by Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978), Larsen, Billings, and Cutler (1996) 
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and Linehan (1993b), overgeneralization has an indirect effect on psychological 
distress through affect intensity and low self-esteem. In Chapter 3, two different 
models based on these suggestions are investigated to find an answer to the 
question what mediates what.
How to manipulate overgeneralization? A pilot proof-of-principle study (Chapter 4)
 After having investigated how overgeneralization affects psychological distress, 
our research turned to the question how overgeneralization can be manipulated in 
clinical practice. Trying to tackle different forms of overgeneralization is in the core 
of the daily practice of not only cognitive behavior therapy but probably in all types 
of verbal psychotherapy. To reduce overgeneralized thinking, therapists try to help 
their patients to notice when they are using absolute terms, such as always or never, 
to describe situations they are unhappy about in detail and subsequently try to 
eliminate these words or replace them with terms, such as sometimes or occasionally. 
They challenge beliefs and help patients to ask themselves if these beliefs really are 
true in every aspect of their life or not. Likewise, behavior therapists help their 
patients to break through avoidance and build up confidence of being able to 
maintain effective functioning in several aspects of life by doing exercises. In this 
way, they challenge overgeneralized ideas of inadequacy as a function of failure or 
disappointment in only one domain. The question remains whether it is possible to 
manipulate a person’s tendency to overgeneralize more directly, thereby helping 
treatment to be more effective or more efficient.
 Watkins and colleagues (Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009; Watkins, Moberly, & 
Moulds, 2008) have described promising research suggesting that a tendency 
toward abstract and overgeneral processing can causally influence depressive 
symptoms in dysphoric individuals and that this tendency is liable to manipulation. 
Their operationalization of overgeneralization, however, leans heavily to an opera-
tionalization of rumination as it aims at the self-relevancy of events and on abstract 
processing of emotional scenarios focusing on causes, meanings, and implications 
of each scenario. Chapter 4 reports on a cognitive bias modification approach to 
the question whether overgeneralization can be induced and how overgeneraliza-
tion training can intensify emotional reactivity when an operationalization of over-
generalization is used that is situation-focused and associative, in contrast to 
self-focused or focused on the causes, meanings, and implications of an event.
 In the final chapter of the present dissertation, Chapter 5, the results of the 
presented studies are summarized and discussed. 
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ABSTrACT
Objective. The aim of this study was to investigate whether (a) overgeneralization 
is restricted to negative attributions directed at the self; or whether it also extends to 
positive self-attributions and to attributions of situations in the outside world, and 
(b) whether the valence and direction (positively or negatively, to the self or across 
situations) of overgeneralization processes vary among different patient populations.
Methods. Patients with major depressive disorder (MDD, n=34), borderline personality 
disorder (BPD, n=18) or both (n=35), and never-depressed non-patients (n=50) 
completed various measures of overgeneralization. 
results. Patients with MDD show higher levels of negative overgeneralization but 
lower levels of positive overgeneralization to the self and across situations than 
non-patients. Patients with MDD show more negative than positive overgeneraliza-
tion to the self: a negative bias. They, however, do show higher levels of positive 
than negative overgeneralization across situations. Patients with BPD show the 
same pattern for overgeneralization to the self, but their higher levels of negative 
overgeneralization across situations are not exceeded by their positive counterpart. 
Conclusions. Results indicate that patient groups differ from non-patients not only 
with respect to negative, but also with respect to positive overgeneralization. 
Furthermore, the valence and direction of overgeneralization processes vary 
among MDD and BPD patient populations. More specifically, findings suggest that, 
as compared to never-depressed individuals, patients with BPD and patients with 
MDD alike, lack a buffer against negative overgeneralization directed at the self. In 
patients with BPD, not only the high level of overgeneralization to the self, but also 
the high level of overgeneralization across situations seems to be problematic, 
since both types of overgeneralization appear not to be buffered by their positive 
counterparts. 
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INTrODuCTION
Overgeneralization, defined by Beck (1976) as “unjustified generalization on the 
basis of a single incident”, is a prominent concept in cognitive theories of personality 
and depression, and is believed to be a basic process, underlying the development 
of maladaptive cognitive schemata (e.g., Beck & Freeman, 1990). Overgeneraliza-
tion predicted the development of depressive symptoms in a longitudinal research 
design (Carver, 1998; Dykman, 1996) and led to slower recovery from dysphoric 
mood states (Edelman, Ahrens & Haaga, 1994). Recently, experimental studies have 
found evidence that overgeneral thinking is a cognitive bias that causally contributes 
to depressive symptoms (Watkins & Moberly, 2009; Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 
2009). Although overgeneralization of autobiographical memory has been studied 
extensively (see Williams et al., 2007), research on overgeneralization in attributions, 
the concept under study here, has been rather scarce. 
Cognitive theory (Beck & Freeman, 1990) assumes that schemata and maladaptive 
automatic thought processes, differ among patient populations and non-patients, 
not only in content, but also in valence (positive or negative) and direction (i.e., 
whether they are directed at the self or at situations in the outside world). 
Therefore, not only the extent but also the valence and direction of the tendency to 
overgeneralize, may vary among patients and non-patients. These variations 
may be relevant for our understanding of the overgeneralization-construct and it’s 
implications for clinical practice, but they have never been tested directly in 
patients who are clinically depressed.
 According to the cognitive distortion view of depression, originally set forth 
by Beck (1967, 1976), people with depression differ from non-depressed not only 
by the negative contents of their thoughts, but also by the inadequacy of their 
inferential processes. Beck (1976) identified overgeneralization, selective abstraction, 
mental filter, arbitrary inference, personalization and dichotomous thinking as the 
major thinking distortions characterizing depressives’ thought. Of the various 
cognitive biases described, overgeneralization was identified as the most reliable 
cognitive indicator of depression (e.g., Carver, 1998; Carver et al., 1985; Ganellen, 
1988). Research on overgeneralization and depression, though, has focused 
predominantly on negative overgeneralization (e.g. Carver, 1998; Carver & Ganellen, 
1983; Flett, Hewitt & Mittelstaedt, 1991; Klar, Gabai & Baron, 1997; Prezant & 
Neimeyer, 1988; Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). Therefore, it cannot be determined 
whether overgeneralization is restricted to negative attributions, or whether it also 
extends to positive attributions. This focus on negative content makes it hard to 
separate the effect of the content from the effect of the inferential process. In 
addition, the tripartite model of mood disorders (Clark & Watson, 1991) suggests 
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that biased cognitive processing specific to depression may emerge more clearly 
when variations in the degree of positive rather than negative processing bias are 
studied (Dunn, et al., 2009).
 The existing literature offers three competing predictions as to whether over-
generalization in individuals suffering from depression is restricted to negative 
content. (1) Epstein (1992) presented evidence that individuals who report poor 
constructive thinking, which is considered a risk factor for the development of 
depression, show more negative overgeneralization than good constructive 
thinkers, while no difference was found concerning positive overgeneralization. 
These findings suggest that overgeneralization is restricted to negative content, 
resulting in a negativity bias. (2) Larsen and colleagues (Larsen, Bilings & Cutler, 
1996; Larsen, Diener & Cropanzano, 1987) found that healthy individuals with high 
affect intensity – who are vulnerable for depression - show high positive as well as 
high negative overgeneralization. These findings lend support to the hypothesis 
that overgeneralization is not restricted to negative content, but that the effect of 
the inferential process per se makes persons with depression more prone than 
non-depressed to make overgeneralized attributions, be it on negative or on 
positive content. (3) A third possibility is offered by the tripartite model of mood 
disorders by Clark and Watson (1991) in which anhedonia (low positive affect) and 
general non-specific negative emotionality are considered specific to depression. In 
line with this theory, Klar et al. (1997) found that participants with subclinical high 
levels of depressive symptoms overgeneralize more following negative events, but 
overgeneralize less following positive events than participants with low levels of 
depressive symptoms. These findings suggest not only a negativity bias, but also a 
(reversed) positivity bias in the overgeneralization tendencies of persons suffering 
from depression. These variations in positive and negative overgeneralization have 
never been tested directly in patients who are clinically depressed. This is the aim 
of the present study.
Overgeneralization-tendencies may vary not only in valence but also in direction. 
Epstein (1992) and Carver and Ganellen (1983) have argued that it is important to 
distinguish between two ways of defining and measuring overgeneralization. One is 
to infer overgeneralization from the presence of unrealistically broad attributions 
about the self (i.e., overgeneralization to the self). The other is to infer overgener-
alization from evidence of overly broad attributions in response to specific situations 
(i.e., overgeneralization across situations). Many researchers assume that the two 
kinds of overgeneralization are related, with the reactive overgeneralization across 
situations following negative events tending to sustain a relatively stable trait of 
low self-esteem (e.g. Carver, Ganellen & Behar-Mitrani, 1985; Kernis, Brockner & 
Frankel, 1989). MacLeod and Williams (1990), however, stressed the heterogeneity 
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of the overgeneralization-concept on the basis of a study, in which they found no 
significant correlation between two overgeneralization-scales, representing the 
two definitions. 
 The distinction between overgeneralization to the self and overgeneralization 
to situations is relevant since many researchers have focused exclusively on the 
relation of overgeneralization with self-esteem in depression. Hayes, Harris, and 
Carver (2004), for example, found negative overgeneralization to be associated 
with low self-esteem as well as variable self-esteem, and with depressive symptoms 
in the past in a non-patient sample. Their findings are consistent with the depression 
model of Roberts and Monroe (1994). Roberts and Monroe describe overgeneral-
ization as a self-deflating process that converts self-criticism following specific and 
limited failures or disappointments into a global rejection of the entire self. Over-
generalization is seen as one of the crucial areas of vulnerability that contribute to 
problems in the regulation of self-esteem, which Roberts and Monroe consider a 
key vulnerability factor in the etiology, maintenance, and recovery of depression. 
 In contrast, hopelessness theory (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989), regards 
low self-esteem as a symptom rather than a cause of depression. Hopelessness 
theory emphasizes negative cognitive styles directed at many areas of life – not 
only those directed at self-esteem - as the diathesis. According to hopelessness 
theory, depression can be caused by generalized hopelessness. Generalized 
hopelessness is more likely to occur when negative life events are viewed as 
important and are attributed to stable and global causes (i.e. overgeneralization). 
Generalized hopelessness occurs when people expect negative outcomes and 
experience helplessness about changing the likelihood of occurrence of these 
outcomes in many areas of life, not only outcomes that affect people’s self-esteem. 
Therefore, it is relevant to examine whether overgeneralizers limit their overgener-
alizations selectively to attributions to the self, or whether overgeneralization also 
relates to situations in other areas, and to what extent these two types are 
connected. Apart from the study by MacLeod and Williams (1990), however, no 
studies have been reported in which both types have been studied simultaneously.
Another question to be answered is whether the valence and direction (positively 
or negatively, to the self or across situations) of overgeneralization processes vary 
among different patient populations. To our knowledge, only Carver et al. (1988) 
examined overgeneralization to the self in patients who are clinically depressed. In 
that study, only negative overgeneralization to the self was studied. Fennell and 
Campbell (1984) examined patients who are clinically depressed, but only on over-
generalization across situations. Other studies have reported significant correlations 
between negative overgeneralization and other emotional disorders such as anxiety 
(Epkins, 1996; Weems, Berman, Silverman & Saavedra, 2001), bulimia (Dritschel, 
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Williams & Cooper, 1991), suicide ideation (Prezant & Neimeyer, 1988), and marital 
violence (Eckhardt & Kassinove, 1998). Again, in these studies only one type of over-
generalization was examined. It therefore remains unclear, whether findings from 
these studies can be generalized to other populations and to other types of over-
generalization. To gain more insight in this particular question, we compared the 
valence and direction of overgeneralization between non-patients, clinical patients 
with MDD, and clinical patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD). 
 We chose patients with BPD as a comparison group, because individuals with 
BPD are particularly known for showing cognitive distortions (e.g. Abela, Payne, & 
Moussaly, 2003; O’Leary et al., 1991) and prominent affect and self-regulation 
problems, even when they are not depressed (e.g. Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, Lejuez & 
Gunderson, 2006; Koenigsberg et al., 2001, 2002; Linehan, 1993; Zeigler-Hill & 
Abraham, 2006). Several authors indicate that the inability to process emotional 
experience, as displayed by patients with BPD, may result in global, undifferentiat-
ed affective states (Westen, et al., 1997; Linehan & Heard, 1992; Levine, Marziali & 
Hood, 1997). These global undifferentiated states resemble the globalized reactions 
that other authors consider characteristic for overgeneralization (e.g., Dykman, 
1996). Therefore, we expected high levels of negative overgeneralization to the self 
in patients with BPD, just like in patients with MDD. However, we did expect 
differences between the patient groups, in the extent in which they engage in 
positive overgeneralization and in overgeneralization across situations. Typically, 
Linehan (1993) and Millon (1996) consider it characteristic for patients with BPD 
that they display a deficiency to modulate affect to the negative as well as to the 
positive side. For that reason, we expected patients with BPD to show not only high 
levels of overgeneralization following negative events, but also following positive 
events. In addition, individuals suffering from BPD are known to show maladaptive 
schemata not only directed at their image of the self, but also of others and the 
world surrounding them (e.g., Arntz, 2004; Young, 1999; Young, Klosko & Weishaar, 
2003). We therefore expected patients with BPD to show high levels of overgener-
alization, not only to the self, but also across situations.
 In summary, the study reported here, addresses three related questions: Is the 
tendency to overgeneralize in individuals suffering from MDD restricted to negative 
content, or does it spread to positive content as well? Is overgeneralization in 
individuals with MDD restricted to misattributions directed at the self, or does it 
also extend to misattributions directed at situations in the outside world? And, 
does the valence and direction of overgeneralization vary among different patient 
populations? More specifically, do patients with MDD show overgeneralization-
tendencies that differ from patients with BPD?
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METHOD
Participants and design
A total of 87 psychiatric patients and 50 non-patients (NP) participated in the 
present study. The mean age for the entire sample was 32.8 years (range 18-58), all 
participants were Caucasian. Group demographics are displayed in table 1. All 
patients were inpatients from two clinical wards, specializing in the psychothera-
peutic treatment of personality disorders and depressive disorders, or outpatients 
from a local Mental Health Service. Patients in a crisis were excluded from the 
study. Patients were selected out of a total population of 135 patients, on the basis 
of (a) a signed informed consent; (b) a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder, 
major depressive disorder or both; and (c) completion of the questionnaire 
measures. The sample contained 34 patients with a diagnosis of MDD, 18 patients 
with a diagnosis of BPD, and 35 patients diagnosed with both BPD and MDD. We did 
not have data of the medication status of all clinical patients. Since a depression 
can negatively influence intellectual performance (e.g., Sackeim, Freeman, 
McElhiney, Coleman et al., 1992), and thus cognitive behavior, an abbreviated 
version of the WAIS III (Information, Picture Completion, Digit Span), based on 
Kaufman’s abbreviated version of the WAIS-R (Boone, 1992), was administered. The 
abbreviated version of the WAIS-R correlates .94 with the WAIS-R full scale. No 
significant differences were found between the groups on this abbreviated measure. 
 Participant patients were diagnosed according to DSM-IV criteria, using the 
Dutch translations of the structured clinical interviews for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders 
((SCID I) First, Spitzer, Gibbon & Williams, 1997; Groenestijn, Akkerhuis, Kupka, 
Schneider & Nolen, 1999) and DSM-IV Axis II Disorders (SCID II) First, Spitzer, Gibbon, 
Williams & Benjamin, 1994; Weertman, Arntz & Kerkhofs, 1997) by experienced 
professionals, specifically trained to administer SCID interviews. The test-retest 
reliability of the original SCID I with the DSM III-R was found to be fair to good 
(kappa= .61) and the interrater-reliability for mood disorders in particular, was good 
(kappas .70 to .92) (Segal, Hersen & Van Hasselt, 1994). The Dutch version of the 
SCID I has not been studied on psychometric properties yet. The short-interval 
test-retest reliability of the Dutch version of the SCID II for the presence or absence 
of any personality disorder was found to be  fair to good (kappa= .63). The Intraclass 
Correlation (ICC) values for BPD trait- and sumscores of this version of the SCID II 
were found to be good (resp., .70 and .71, Weertman, Arntz, Dreessen, van Velzen & 
Vertommen, 2003). The use of SCID I and II interviews was standard procedure in 
the clinical setting, where most of the participants were recruited. In the other 
setting, after informed consent had been obtained, both interviews were held. As a 
standard procedure, all SCID-diagnoses were also discussed with a neutral 
supervisor, a registered and experienced clinical psychologist or psychotherapist, 
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who was involved in the treatment of the particular patients, but not otherwise 
involved in the study. 
The 50 healthy non-patient comparison participants (35 females, 15 males) were 
recruited by a ‘stone in the pond’-procedure, where the first author asked a 
participant to ask a friend to participate, who in turn asked a friend etcetera. The 
non-patient group was not recruited among university students, but was matched 
to the MDD-group on age and level of education. The comparison participants were 
administered an abbreviated version of the SCID I (a shortlist screening all A-criteria 
of the DSM IV axis I disorders) via the telephone. If one or more DSM diagnostic 
criteria were met, or if an individual had sought help for psychological problems in 
the past, the person was excluded from the sample. All of the non-patients had BDI 
scores below 14 (M=4.06). The study was approved by the local Central Committee 
on Research involving Human Subjects (CMO number 2002/259).
Procedure and Materials
After provision of informed consent and completion of the diagnostic interviews, 
each subject completed the various overgeneralization measures. Participants were 
told that the study concerned “information processing in people with psychological 
problems”. The pen and paper tests were administered in a standard order.
Overgeneralization to the self
To assess overgeneralization to the self, we used the overgeneralization sub-scale 
of the Attitudes Towards Self Scale (ATSS; Carver & Ganellen, 1983). The ATSS over-
generalization scale is the most widely used self-report measure for negative over-
generalization to the self. In order to measure positive overgeneralization to the 
Table 1  Characteristics of participants in the study
Age (years) Gender
M SD Males Females Inpatients Outpatients
NP (n=50) 36.52 11.25 15 35 0 0
MDD (n=34) 35.00 12.14 14 20 25 9
BPD (n=18) 27.33 8.76 5 13 18 0
BPD + MDD (n=35) 28.08 6.57 0 35 34 1
Note. NP= Non-patients; MDD= Major Depressive Disorder without Borderline Personality Disorder; 
BPD= Borderline Personality Disorder without a comorbid Major Depressive Disorder; BPD+MDD= 
Borderline Personality Disorder with a comorbid Major Depressive Disorder. 
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self, we constructed positive variants of the ATSS items (e.g. When something goes 
all right, I feel great and get the feeling that I can do anything.) (see appendix 1 for 
the full scales) The original negative subscale of the ATSS is referred to as the ATSS- 
and the positive variant as ATSS+. In the Dutch version of the ATSS-, two items were 
dropped, one item because it was about positive as well as negative overgeneraliza-
tion, the other because it had a very negative effect on the internal consistency. 
Internal consistency figures for these newly developed Dutch scales in the current 
study were good (Cronbach’s alphas of .94 for ATSS- and .83 for ATSS+). Carver and 
Ganellen (1983) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .82 for the original 7 item English 
version of the ATSS- overgeneralization-subscale. We used the ATSS because the 
inference of overgeneralization from the presence of unrealistically broad attributions 
about the self (i.e. overgeneralization to the self) is, in our opinion, achieved most 
validly when a self-report measure is used.
Overgeneralization to situations
To obtain evidence of overly broad attributions in response to specific situations 
(i.e., overgeneralization across situations), a measure in which participants make 
actual predictions in reaction to antecedent events, is more valid. We used the task 
developed by Klar and colleagues (1997), which is based on the judgment-under-
uncertainty literature. In this task, participants are asked to make predictions of the 
probability of the reoccurrence of a given hypothetical situation (Klar et al., 1997). 
As such, it provides a direct measure of actual generalizations about future events 
in reaction to a single situation. The task was translated into Dutch and the content 
of the items was adjusted for use with an adult population (Klar’s items were made 
for a high-school population). Like the original version, this ‘Overgeneralization 
Test’ (OGT) as we called it, includes 20 vignettes of hypothetical everyday situations, 
10 positive (e.g., “You asked a person you like, to go out with you, and he/she said 
yes), and 10 negative (e.g., “You were late for an important meeting because you 
had a flat tire.”) (for the full scales see appendix 2). The participants read the 
vignettes and were asked to imagine the situations happening to themselves. 
Subsequently they were asked to indicate the probability of the situation happening 
to them again in the future, using a 10 cm visual analogue scale ranging from 0 to 
100%. As in the study by Klar et al. (1997), half the items were of a social nature and 
half the items were of an achievement nature. Internal consistency figures for these 
newly developed scales in a pilot test with a student population (n=25) were 
adequate (Cronbach’s alphas of .65 for OGT+ and .74 for OGT-); in the current study, 
they were good (Cronbach’s alphas of .81 for OGT+ and .81 for OGT-).1
1 To ensure that the situations were familiar to the participants, and that they agreed with the researcher 
on the valence of the situations, they were asked to indicate - after scoring the different events for their 
probability of recurrence - the degree of familiarity for all of the items and  to score the items with regard 
to their positive, negative, or neutral nature. We found a mean familiarity of 69.0 % (sd=2.35), and 85.9 % 
(sd=9.06) correspondence between the participants’ and our indication of the valence of the items.
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Statistical analysis
Given the fact that the BPD+MDD-group contained only female participants, we 
performed two separate analyses. First, we analyzed group differences for both 
males and females in only three groups: NPs, MDDs and BPDs. For this analysis, we 
performed a two-way multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with Group 
and Gender as the between-subjects factors, age as a covariate and the positive 
and negative versions of both types of overgeneralization as the dependent 
variables. Contrast analyses were executed for planned comparisons. Subsequently, 
to be able to report on differences between the BPD+MDD-group and the other 
groups, these analyses were repeated with all four groups (NPs, MDDs, BPDs and 
BPD+MDDs) as the between-subjects factor. This analysis could be performed only 
with female participants. Contrast analyses were performed with the BPD+MDD 
group as reference category. To study whether participants showed a positivity or 
a negativity bias for each type of overgeneralization, paired samples t-tests were 
performed within each group.
rESulTS
Tests showed that the assumption of homogeneity of regression was validated. The 
MANCOVA examining group differences on the positive and negative versions of 
both types of overgeneralization in both males and females in three groups (Patients 
with BPD, patients with MDD and NPs) resulted in significant main effects for Group 
(F(8,184)= 14.371, p<.00001, ηp
2=.385) and Age (F(4,92)= 2.560, p=.044, ηp
2=.100). 
Univariate F-tests showed that the three groups differed significantly on all four 
measures of overgeneralization (see table 2 for means, standard deviations, main 
effects and planned comparisons). There was an Age effect for OGT- (F(1,95)=9.869, 
p=.002, ηp
2=.094). There were no significant univariate interactions with Age, nor 
Gender effects for all four overgeneralization-measures. Contrast-analyses 
indicated that both MDDs and BPDs differed from NPs on overgeneralization (both 
p<.00001), but not from each other. Subsequently, planned comparisons revealed 
that BPDs and MDDs both showed higher negative overgeneralization to the self 
than NPs. MDDs also showed higher negative overgeneralization across situations 
than NPs. BPDs did not differ from NPs on negative overgeneralization across 
situations. BPDs and MDDs both showed less positive overgeneralization to the self 
and across situations than NPs. 
 Paired samples t-tests revealed that NPs showed higher positive than negative 
overgeneralization to the self (t(49)=13.250, p<.00001, d=2.50) and across situations 
(t(49)=15.112, p<.00001, d=3.06). MDDs showed higher negative than positive over-
generalization to the self (t(33)=-4.398, p=.0001, d=1.27), but higher positive than 
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negative overgeneralization across situations (t(33)=4.476, p<.0001, d=1.02). BPDs 
showed higher negative than positive overgeneralization to the self (t(17)=-3.085, 
p<.01, d=1.27). The difference between positive and negative overgeneralization 
across situations, however, was not significant for BPDs (t(17)=2.063, p=.055, d=.81).
 The second MANCOVA examined differences between the BPD+MDD-group 
and the other groups, and was performed with only females. This analysis resulted 
in a significant main effect for Group (F(12,254)=12.553, p<.00001, ηp
2=.337) and no 
significant effect for Age. Therefore, Age was removed as a covariate. Univariate 
F-tests showed that the four groups differed significantly on all measures of over-
generalization (see table 3 for means, standard deviations, main effects and planned 
comparisons). The contrasts presented in the first analysis were also significant in 
the second. Furthermore, contrast-analyses indicated that BPD+MDDs differed 
from NPs (p<.00001), and MDDs (p=.001) but not from BPDs (p=.092). Subsequently, 
planned comparisons revealed that BPD+MDDs showed higher negative overgener-
alization to the self and across situations than NPs, higher negative overgeneraliza-
tion to the self than MDDs, and lower positive overgeneralization to the self and 
across situations than both NPs and MDDs. Paired samples t-tests revealed that 
BPD+MDDs showed higher negative than positive overgeneralization to the self 
(t(34)=-12.354, p<.00001, d=3.34). They did not show a difference between positive 
and negative overgeneralization across situations (t(34)=.131, p=.897, d=.04).
DISCuSSION 
The present study is the first to explore the degree of negative, as well as positive 
overgeneralization to the self and across situations in a clinical sample of patients 
suffering from MDD and/or BPD, as compared to never depressed non-patients. 
Results show that patients with MDD differ from non-patients in that they show 
more negative overgeneralization - to the self and across situations - but less 
positive overgeneralization. This illustrates that variations in the tendency to over-
generalize between patients and non-patients are not restricted to negative content. 
The absence, though, rather than the presence of positive overgeneralization, 
appears to be related to emotional disorders. The data confirm, now in a clinical 
population, the findings by Klar et al. (1997), that patients suffering from MDD 
not only overgeneralize more following negative events than non-patients, but 
they overgeneralize less following positive events as well. These findings are in 
agreement with the cognitive distortion view of depression (Beck,1976) in that 
patients with MDD differ from non-patients not only in the negative content of 
their thoughts, but also in their inferential process: patients with MDD show a 
 processing-bias in that they have different overgeneralization tendencies than 
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non-patients. Furthermore, these findings are in line with the hypothesis of the 
tripartite model of mood disorders by Clark and Watson (1991) that depression can 
be accounted for not only by the presence of negative overgeneralization, but also 
– or even more - by the absence of positive overgeneralization. The findings further 
illustrate that overgeneralization in individuals with MDD is not restricted to misat-
tributions directed at the self, but extends to misattributions directed at situations 
in the outside world. This finding justifies a broader focus on overgeneralization 
than only on overgeneralization to the self, which is in accordance with the 
hopelessness theory of Abramson, Metalsky and Alloy (1989).
 Patients with BPD differ from non-patients in that they show more negative and 
less positive overgeneralization to the self. Patients with both BPD + MDD even 
show more negative and less positive overgeneralization to the self than patients 
with MDD.  So, for overgeneralization to the self, patients with MDD and patients 
with BPD show the same pattern, with patients with BPD+MDD showing a cumulated 
effect. For overgeneralization across situations, patients with MDD and patients 
with BPD show the same pattern for positive attributions, with BPD+MDD showing 
a cumulated effect. In this study, patients with BPD only show more negative over-
generalization across situations than non-patients when they are also suffering 
from a comorbid MDD. So, in contrast with never-depressed individuals, and with 
the exception of negative overgeneralization across situations, patients with MDD 
and patients with BPD show more or less the same pattern in their tendency to 
overgeneralize. Patients suffering from both disorders appear to show this pattern 
to a larger degree.
 Further, results show that non-patients show more positive than negative over-
generalization, indicative of a positivity bias. This finding is in agreement with 
findings by Epstein (1992) and Klar et al. (1997). Epstein (1992) suggested that this 
positivity bias in non-patients serves as a tendency toward unrealistic but healthy 
self-enhancement. In our study, this effect was found in attributions to the self as 
well as across situations, suggesting that this positivity bias in healthy individuals 
not only enhances their self-confidence, but also protects their view of the world 
against the effect of negative overgeneralization.
 Patients with MDD, BPD and BPD+MDD all show more negative than positive 
overgeneralization to the self. So, all patients show a negativity bias on overgener-
alization to the self, and not a positivity bias as non-patients do. These findings 
suggest that, as compared to never-depressed individuals, patients with BPD and 
patients with MDD both lack a buffer against negative cognitions directed at the self 
(e.g. Lightsey, 1994). Then again, these patient groups show different biases on 
overgeneralization across situations. While the patients with MDD resemble the 
non-patients’ positivity bias in showing more positive than negative overgeneral-
ization across situations, patients with BPD – with or without a comorbid MDD – 
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show neither a positivity, nor a negativity bias. The difference between these 
patient groups appears to be that while patients with MDD seem to be able to hold 
on to expectations of positive situations to come again, patients with BPD appear to 
lack this specific positivity bias. It appears that since patients with BPD lack a 
healthy positivity bias, it is very difficult for them to profit from positive experiences 
happening to themselves or around them. These results lend support to the 
assumption, formulated by authors like Beck and Freeman (1990), Young (1999, 
2003), and Depue and Lenzenweger (2005), that patients with BPD – even more 
than patients with MDD - distort their view of life events only in a negative manner. 
The finding of a negativity bias on the self in patients with BPD is in agreement with 
Kernberg’s (1975) conception of a preponderance of negative affect in relation to 
positive affect in BPD, which in his theory results in splitting, a construct conceptually 
related to overgeneralization. The results are also in line with findings by Sieswerda, 
Arntz and Wolfis (2005), which indicated, that patients with BPD are best 
characterized by a general negative evaluative style, more than by dichotomous 
(black and white) thinking, and, that the extreme negative evaluations of patients 
with BPD are not restricted to the personal domain, but spread more globally to 
non(inter)personal situations as well. Data from the current study go beyond these 
earlier studies, as they indicate, that this negativity bias appears to be influenced 
not only by negative overgeneralization, that is too high, but also by positive over-
generalization, that is too low: patients with BPD tend not to generalize, as much as 
normal people do,  following positive situations in the outside world. As a result 
they lack a healthy positivity bias.
 The results indicate that although patients with MDD do show a positivity bias 
when overgeneralizing across situational attributions, this bias is still reduced 
relative to non-patients suggesting that depressed individuals do have an altered 
view both of self and world. For both groups, the emotional biases in information 
processing seem to be greater for self (both show a negativity bias) than for across 
situations (MDD - reduced positivity bias, BPD - no emotion bias). This is an 
interesting finding, which suggests that in all patient groups information processing 
is biased for both self and world but that self-relevant information processing has a 
larger impact. It may also mean that MDD and BPD both are disorders in which 
self-esteem is deflated as a result of overgeneralization but that patients with BPD 
also have a less positive image of the world.  
 Contrary to expectation, we did not find patients with BPD to differ from 
patients with MDD in the valence of their tendency to overgeneralize. Both patient 
groups showed higher levels of negative and lower levels of positive overgeneral-
ization. This finding contrasts with hypotheses formulated on the basis of the 
influential models of BPD by Linehan (1993) and Millon (1996) who both call attention 
to the presence of high intensity of negative as well as positive affect in patients 
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with BPD. In several studies their hypothesis of enhanced intensity of positive affect 
states in BPD was not confirmed (e.g. Yen et al., 2002) which is more in line with our 
findings. 
 The differences between self-attributions and situational attributions could 
also be ascribed to differences in the amount of abstractness versus concreteness 
of the patients’ mode of processing. Watkins and colleagues (e.g. Watkins, Baeyens, 
& Read, 2009) have presented evidence of a maladaptive over-abstract processing 
style in individuals with depression resulting in more global negative self-evaluations. 
In contrast to a more concrete, experiential way of processing information resulting 
in reduced overgeneral recall and reduced global negative self-evaluations. Such 
difference in abstract and concrete processing, as described by Watkins and his 
coworkers, may also be present in the tasks we used to measure overgeneralization 
to the self and across situations. An explanation of the differences we found from a 
processing mode perspective (abstract versus concrete) instead of from a content 
perspective (attributions to the self versus to situations) is an interesting one and 
deserves further investigation.
 Several factors limit the generalizability of the results of the present study. 
Patients were recruited in different settings. Therefore, patient groups may differ in 
symptom acuity that does not show up in the SCID-data, and this may be influencing 
the results. As far as the observed differences between patients with BPD and 
patients with MDD are concerned, the question of comorbidity is relevant. One 
reason to expect high levels of overgeneralization in individuals diagnosed with 
BPD, is that this patient group is known to have high comorbidity figures with all 
types of disorders that were found to be associated with overgeneralization: 
depression (e.g. Skodol et al., 1999; Corruble, Ginestet & Guelfi, 1996), anxiety (e.g. 
Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen, Reich & Silk, 2004),  eating disorders, especially 
bulimia (e.g. Van Hanswijck De Jonge, Van Furth, Hubert Lacey & Waller, 2003), 
recurrent suicidal behavior (e.g. Yen, et al., 2003), impulsiveness in general (e.g. 
Dowson et al., 2004) and marital violence (e.g. Edwards, Scott, Yarvis, Paizis & 
Panizzon, 2003). Clearly, comorbidity can act as a possible confounder in this 
patient group. Especially, reservations must be made regarding patients with BPD 
who have experienced one or more (subclinical) depressive episodes in their lives. 
In our study 55.6% of the patients with BPD, not suffering from MDD at the time of 
testing, indeed had experienced at least one depressive episode in the past. On the 
other hand, overgeneralization may be so nonspecific, that it applies to all types of 
(more severe) psychopathology. In that case, overgeneralization would be as 
characteristic to BPD as it is to depression, and the more specific characteristics 
we observed, may help to gain more insight in the impact of this important 
phenomenon. Nonetheless, since our study lacked a measure of depression severity, 
it is impossible to determine whether the differences between the MDD and the 
Ch
ap
te
r 
 2
A
n 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
of
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
ov
er
ge
ne
ra
liz
at
io
n 
in
 p
at
ie
nt
s 
w
it
h 
m
aj
or
 d
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
di
so
rd
er
 a
nd
 b
or
de
rl
in
e 
pe
rs
on
al
it
y 
di
so
rd
er
39
BPD+MDD group are not simply a result of differences in depression severity. This 
could be an area for future investigation.
 Both the item-set for positive overgeneralization to the self and the measures 
for overgeneralization across situations were developed for this study and are of 
unknown validity. Yet, the original versions of both scales are backed up by an 
impressive body of research on respectively negative overgeneralization to the self 
(see, e.g. Carver, 1998) and judgment under uncertainty (see Klar et al., 1997), and 
the internal consistency figures of the used scales are good. In wording, the positive 
overgeneralization to the self item-set is an exact opposite of the frequently used 
negative item-set. Furthermore, despite of the fact that the ATSS and OGT are 
rather different ways of measuring overgeneralization, we found almost identical 
scoring-patterns. Therefore, concurrent validity appears adequate. Both measures 
have their own strengths and in our opinion reflect validly the differences between 
the two types of overgeneralization. The weakness of the ATSS is, that it is a self- 
report measure and therefore dependent on the self-awareness of the participants 
(e.g. MacLeod & Williams, 1990). On the other hand, it is based on real experience. 
The OGT uses hypothetical situations, but does not depend on the participant’s 
awareness of his cognitive behavior (Klar et al., 1997). Finally, the order of the 
questionnaires was not counterbalanced. Therefore, order effects may have 
influenced performance. 
 In conclusion, in patients suffering from MDD, high levels of negative over-
generalization directed at the self, appear to be especially problematic because 
they surpass the level of positive overgeneralization to the self. The high level of 
negative overgeneralization across situations, that was also found in this patient 
group, might be less problematic since it does not surpass the level of positive over-
generalization across situations. In patients with BPD, not only the high level of 
overgeneralization to the self, but also the high level of overgeneralization across 
situations seems to be problematic, since both types of overgeneralization appear 
not to be buffered by their positive counterparts. These findings direct the focus of 
attention on the role of not only negative overgeneralization to the self, but also of 
positive overgeneralization to the self, as well as across situations in research with 
patients suffering from these disorders. If overgeneralization is indeed one of the 
basic processes underlying the development or activation of cognitive schemata, as 
was suggested by Beck and Freeman (1990), the high levels of negative overgener-
alization or perhaps even more the low levels of positive overgeneralization in 
these patient populations, may explain why patients and their therapists struggle 
so hard when trying to reconstruct basic schemata in the course of treatment. After 
all, as long as negative overgeneralization prevails over positive overgeneralization, 
the chance that patients will develop even more negative schemata is much higher 
than the chance that they will develop new positive schemata.
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APPENDIx 1
Items of the Dutch version of the overgeneralization subscale of the Attitudes 
Towards Self Scale (ATSS)
ATSS-
1.  How I feel about myself overall, is easily influenced by a single mistake.
2.  My feelings about myself drop, if I notice any weaknesses or shortcomings at all.
3.  The things about myself that other people like and respect, are unimportant to 
me when I feel down.
4.  When even one thing goes wrong, I begin to feel bad and wonder if I can do well 
at anything at all.
5.  If something goes wrong – no matter what it is – I see myself negatively.
ATSS+
6.  If something goes right – no matter what it is – I get a very positive image of 
myself.
7.  When I realize I did something well, nothing can bring me down.
8.  When something goes all right, I feel great and get the feeling that I can do 
anything.
9.  When I feel good, other people’s opinion of me becomes highly irrelevant to me.
10.  My feelings about myself rise if I realize my talents and strengths.
NB. Original items in Dutch can be retrieved from the first author.
APPENDIx 2
Vignettes of the Dutch version of the overgeneralization-test (OGT)
OGT-
1.  When you turned on the television yesterday, there was a break in transmission, 
as a result of which you couldn’t watch your favorite show. How probable is 
it that the next time you want to watch that show there will be a break in 
transmission again?
2.  A good friend of yours is going abroad for a long time. If you meet a new friend, 
how probable is it that this new friend will leave you as well?
3.  Yesterday you were late for an important meeting due to a flat tire. How 
probable is it that the next time you have an important meeting you will have a 
flat tire again and be late?
4.  Last year it rained heavily in June. How probable is it that it will rain heavily in 
June this year again?
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5.  You have met a person you like very much. After a few weeks he/she turned out 
to be not as nice as you thought. How probable is it that,  next time you meet 
someone you like, this person will turn out to be not so nice either?
6.  Your new neighbor often turns on very loud music when you want to go to 
sleep. How probable is it that when you get a new neighbor he/she will be a 
nuisance too?
7.  The other day, you had to go to the ninth floor of a department building. You 
went up in an elevator and, because of a technical problem, the elevator got 
stuck and you were caught for over 15 minutes. How probable is it that next 
time you take an elevator, it will get stuck also?
8.  This morning during breakfast, you accidentally spilled your milk. How probable 
is it that you will spill something again during tomorrow morning’s breakfast?
9.  Friday morning last week you had an important meeting. The night before you 
set your alarm clock wrongly. Consequently you overslept and missed your 
appointment. In two weeks, you have an important meeting again. How 
probable is it that you will oversleep again?
10.  You were walking home on the sidewalk the other day when a car passed right 
by you through a puddle causing your trousers to get all dirty and wet. How 
probable is it that the next time you are walking on the sidewalk, you will be 
spattered again?
OGT+
11.  Last time when you had a couple of days off, the weather was great. How probable 
is it that the next time you have a day off, you will have beautiful weather again?
12.  You had a job-interview, you prepared very well for. You just got the message 
you can have the job. This week you have another job-interview, that you also 
want to prepare well for. How probable is it, that you will get this job too?
13.  You met someone you like. You asked this person to go and have a drink with 
you and he/she said ‘yes’. How probable is it that the next time you meet 
someone you like and ask this person to have a drink, he/she will say ‘yes’ also?
14.  Yesterday, when you went shopping, a product that you wanted to buy anyway, 
turned out to be on sale. How probable is it that when you go shopping again 
tomorrow, again something you want to buy, will be on sale?
15.  You entered a competition in your local paper. The jury chose your slogan as the 
winning entrance. How probable is it that if you enter the competition next 
year, the jury will reward your contribution again with a prize?
16.  You asked your supervisor if you could leave early for an important thing you 
had to do. He consulted the manager and you got permission. Next week you 
have to leave early again, when you work under another supervisor. How probable 
is it that you will get permission again?
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17.  Last year you worked very hard and your boss gave you a raise in salary. If you 
will work hard this year again. How probable is it that you will get a raise next 
year?
18.  You got a very difficult assignment. You have done your best and got a very 
good result. How probable is it that next time you get such a difficult assignment, 
you will succeed again?
19. Last weekend your friends taught you a new game of skill. The first time you 
played you won right-away. How probable is it that, when you play the game 
once more, you will win again?
20.  Last year you got a new colleague. You two got on together very well and you 
became good friends. How probable is it that when you get a new colleague 
again, you will become friends also?
NB. Original vignettes in Dutch can be retrieved from the first author.
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Overgeneralization and Psychological 
Distress in a Clinical Population: 
The Mediating role of Affect Intensity 
and Self-Esteem
Van den Heuvel, T.J., Eling, P.A.T.M., Van der Veld, W.M., Derksen, J.J.L., 
& Van der Staak, C.P.F. (2012). Overgeneralizati on and Psychological Distress in 
a Clinical Populati on: The Mediati ng Role of Aff ect Intensity and Self-Esteem. 
Manuscript submitt ed for publicati on.
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ABSTrACT
Objective. A growing amount of empirical literature suggests that overgeneraliza-
tion is associated with emotional disorders as a factor that instigates psychological 
distress. This study was conducted to better understand the relation between over-
generalization, low self-esteem, high affect intensity and psychological distress, 
and to answer the question whether low self-esteem and high affect intensity 
mediate the relation between overgeneralization and psychological distress, or, 
that overgeneralization is the mediator.
Methods. The two mediation models were investigated, using structural equation 
modeling in a clinical sample of 101 individuals, all diagnosed with one or more 
personality disorders in addition to various axis 1 disorders.
results. The results show that both low self-esteem and negative affect intensity 
mediate the relation between overgeneralization and acute psychological distress.
Conclusions. The findings from the current study indicate that clinicians should not 
only focus on the treatment of their patients’ low self-esteem and the high intensity 
of their emotions, but also on their overgeneralizing cognitive style especially in 
patients suffering from a personality disorder.
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INTrODuCTION
A fundamental theme in emotion research is that biased cognitive processes are 
central features of probably all emotional disorders. A cognitive bias that is shown 
to be of great implication in the onset and maintenance of depression is overgener-
alization. Various studies provide evidence that overgeneralization – defined by 
Beck (1976) as unjustified generalization on the basis of a single incident – is related 
to depression and depressive mood states (e.g., Carver, 1998; Carver & Ganellen, 
1983; Flett, Hewitt & Mittelstaedt, 1991; Ganellen, 1988; Klar, Gabai, & Baron, 1997). 
In more recent studies, overgeneralization is found in individuals with other 
emotional disorders such as bulimia (Dritschel, Williams & Cooper, 1991), anxiety 
disorders (Epkins, 1996; Weems, Berman, Silverman & Saavedra, 2001), and 
borderline personality disorder (Van den Heuvel, Derksen, Eling & Van der Staak, in 
press). Two studies demonstrate that overgeneralization predicts the development 
of depressive symptoms in non-clinical samples in a longitudinal research design 
(Carver, 1998; Dykman, 1996). These findings suggest that overgeneralization is 
associated to general psychopathology as a factor that instigates psychological 
distress. It remains unclear though, how individual differences in the tendency to 
overgeneralize lead to differences in the level of psychological distress. 
 In the literature, overgeneralization and psychological distress are associated 
with self-esteem (e.g., Roberts & Monroe, 1994) and with affect intensity (e.g. 
Larsen & Diener, 1987). The relation with self-esteem is discussed in Roberts and 
Monroe’s  multidimensional model of the etiology, maintenance, and recovery of 
depression (1994). This model suggests that overgeneralization is one of three 
crucial areas of vulnerability that contribute to problems in the regulation of 
self-esteem. Roberts and Monroe describe overgeneralization as a self-deflating 
process that converts self-criticism following specific and limited failures or disap-
pointments into a global rejection of the entire self. Numerous studies provide 
evidence for the relation between level of self-esteem and depressive symptoms 
(e.g. Beck, Brown, Steer, Kuyken, & Grisham, 2001; Butler, Hokanson, & Flynn, 1994; 
Kernis, Granneman, & Mathis, 1991; Oosterwegel, Field, Hart, & Anderson, 2001). 
Hayes, Harris, and Carver (2004) have found negative overgeneralization to be 
associated with low self-esteem as well as variable self-esteem, and with depressive 
symptoms in the past in a non-patient sample. 
 The relation with affect intensity is discussed by Larsen and Diener (1987) who 
define affect intensity as “stable individual differences in the strength with which 
individuals experience their emotions”. High affect intensity is associated with a 
number of emotional disorders (e.g., Dizen, 2006; Flett, Blankstein & Obertynski, 
1995) and individuals with high affect intensity tend to experience greater 
psychological distress (Levine, Marziali, & Hood, 1997; Yen, Zlotnick, & Costello, 
52
2002).  Individual differences in affect intensity have been found to correlate with 
the tendency to overgeneralize (Larsen, Billings, & Cutler, 1996; Larsen, Diener, & 
Cropanzano, 1987; Dritschel & Teasdale, 1991).
 These findings suggest that (1) both affect intensity and low self-esteem are 
associated to overgeneralization; (2) the intensity of affect and level of self-esteem 
respectively, are distinct constructs with differential outcomes (e.g., Larsen, 1989; 
Roberts & Monroe, 1994); and (3) both affect intensity and low self-esteem are 
associated to psychological distress. Yet, it is unclear how these constructs relate to 
each other. 
Overgeneralization as mediator
According to Beck’s cognitive model (1976) individuals develop negative views of 
the self under certain circumstances, which grow into trait-like maladaptive cognitive 
schemata. These negative self-schemata bias cognitive processing in an overly 
negative and depressive fashion which lead to greater vulnerability to psychological 
distress. In line with this theory, overgeneralization mediates the relation between 
level of self-esteem and psychological distress. Kernis, Brockner & Frankel (1989), 
Brown & Dutton (1995), and Wenzlaf & Grozier (1988) have found support for this 
hypothesis in a non-patient sample. 
 Larsen (2000) in his control theory of mood regulation, describes how individuals 
with trait high affect intensity are more likely to engage in mood intensifying 
cognitive behavior (such as overgeneralization) when in a state of under-arousal, 
thus making them more vulnerable to psychological distress. In line with this theory, 
overgeneralization mediates the relation between affect intensity and psychological 
distress.
 Beck (1976) and Larsen (2000) describe how overgeneralization mediates the 
effect of either affect intensity or self-esteem on psychological distress. The biosocial 
theory of personality functioning by Linehan (1993a), offers an hypothesis that 
involves both the regulation of the intensity of affect and the level of self-esteem. 
According to this theory, certain individuals are assumed to possess a biological 
predisposition for a heightened intensity of affect. Individuals with high affect 
intensity, who grow up in an invalidating environment, may develop a self-invalidating 
cognitive style, resulting in (trait) low self-esteem. Linehan argues that the transaction 
between high affect intensity and self-invalidation leads these individuals to engage 
in maladaptive emotion-regulation strategies such as rumination, a concept closely 
related to overgeneralization, which in turn leads to distress. Thus, according to 
this biosocial theory, overgeneralization mediates the relation between affect intensity 
and self-esteem on one side and psychological distress on the other.
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Following the suggestions made by Beck (1976), Larsen (2000) and Linehan (1993a), 
we arrive at the model described in figure 1. According to this model, affect intensity 
and low self-esteem have an indirect effect on psychological distress through over-
generalization.
Overgeneralization as predictor
According to the reformulated learned helplessness model (Abramson, Seligman, & 
Teasdale, 1978), individuals who attribute negative events to internal, stable and 
global causes, are likely to suffer depression if negative events happen to them. The 
basis for this attribution is a maladaptive cognitive style that leads to trait-like 
negative self-depreciation which in turn may lead to a greater vulnerability to 
psychological distress. In line with this theory, low self-esteem mediates the 
relation between overgeneralization and psychological distress. 
 Larsen, Billings, and Cutler (1996) suggest in their model of informational style 
that overgeneralization leads individuals to interpret affective stimuli in a manner 
that intensifies the affective response to those stimuli. This in turn results in high 
affect intensity, which makes them more susceptible to psychological distress. In 
line with this theory, affect intensity mediates the relation between overgenerali-
zation and psychological distress. Van den Heuvel, Eling, Derksen and Van der Staak 
(2012) present evidence in support of this hypothesis in an experimental study in 
which participants, who are trained to overgeneralize, subsequently show higher 
affect intensity. 
 The work of Linehan also offers an alternative explanation for the relations 
between overgeneralization, psychological distress, affect intensity, and low 
self-esteem, than the one described earlier. In her skills training manual (1993b), 
figure 1  Overgeneralization as mediator
Overgeneralization PsychologicalDistress
Affect intensity
Low Self-Esteem
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Linehan describes how individuals can react to situations from a state called the 
‘emotional mind’. In this state of mind, they tend to process information in an 
overgeneral manner, in which the specific details of factual events are ignored, 
resulting in overgeneralizations and catastrophizations of their thoughts and 
experiences. This state of mind can lead to both extremely intense emotional 
reactions and judgmental self-invalidating thoughts which subsequently lead to 
distress. Here, overgeneralization predicts the rise of intensity of affects and the 
lowering of self-esteem.
 Following the suggestions made by Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978), 
Larsen, Billings, and Cutler (1996) and Linehan (1993b), we arrive at the model 
described in figure 2. In this model, overgeneralization has an indirect effect on 
psychological distress through affect intensity and low self-esteem. 
To our knowledge, no studies have been reported on sophisticated models that 
investigate whether overgeneralization mediates or predicts the effect of both affect 
intensity and self-esteem on psychological distress. The current study does exactly 
that. 
Choice of the population
By far most research on the concepts in this study is performed in non-clinical 
samples. We are especially interested in the effects of overgeneralization in 
emotionally disordered patients. Relations between the described variables may be 
different in clinical and non-clinical populations, and therefore conclusions from 
research in these populations may be different too. For example, people with low 
self-esteem in non-clinical populations do not regard themselves in excessively 
figure 2  Overgeneralization as predictor
Psychological
Distress
Affect intensity
Low Self-Esteem
Overgeneralization
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negative terms, as clinical patients do (Baumeister, Tice & Hutton, 1989). Instead, 
they generally hold positive beliefs about themselves, particularly relative to their 
beliefs about others (Brown & Gallagher, 1992). 
 We investigate these concepts in a clinical sample of patients suffering from 
Axis II personality disorders, since a typical problem in studies on Beck’s cognitive 
model is that the strength of the relations between variables may be different 
dependent on whether and to what extent schemata are activated. One group of 
individuals that is shown to engage in depressotypic thinking, even in the absence 
of a depressive syndrome, are patients diagnosed with Axis II personality disorders 
(Ilardi & Craighead, 1999). This makes this group highly suitable for the investigation 
of these relations in clinical populations.
METHOD
Participants
The clinical sample (N=101) consists of psychiatric inpatients recruited from the 
Scelta Expertise Center for Personality Disorders in Apeldoorn, the Netherlands. 
Patients were asked to participate in the study, when they had been referred for 
the inpatient treatment units of the Scelta Expertise Center for Personality 
Disorders. Participants completed the diagnostic interviews as part of the standard 
general assessment for their treatment. Participants were diagnosed according to 
DSM-IV criteria by trained psychologists under supervision of experienced clinical 
psychologists, not otherwise involved in the study. The Dutch translation was used 
of the structured clinical interviews for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders ((SCID I) First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997; Groenestijn, Akkerhuis, Kupka, Schneider & 
Nolen, 1999) and DSM-IV Axis II Disorders ((SCID II) First, Spitzer, Gibbon, Williams, 
& Benjamin, 1994; Weertman, Arntz, Dreessen, van Velzen & Vertommen, 2003). 
Patients in an acute crisis were not included in the study. Participants were not 
compensated. All participants gave informed consent and the study was approved 
by the institutional’s medical ethics committee.
 Participants had a mean age of 28.8 years (range 18 - 51), 75 were female. All 
participants were Caucasian. All participants had either a primary or secondary 
diagnosis of one or more axis II personality disorders (avoidant (n=25), dependent 
(n=12), obsessive-compulsive (n=20), paranoid (n=25), schizoid (n=3), histrionic 
(n=4), narcissistic (n=4), borderline (n=43) and anti-social (n=19)); 24 participants 
had a diagnosis of personality disorder NOS or a deferred diagnosis on Axis II but 
enough features of different personality disorders to justify at least a diagnosis of 
personality disorder NOS. In addition, 17 participants had a current comorbid 
diagnosis of major depressive disorder, 48 had suffered from a depressive episode 
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in the past, 32 had a dysthymic disorder and 3 had a bipolar disorder. Additional 
comorbid Axis I diagnoses included panic disorder with (n=6) and without 
agoraphobia (n=8), agoraphobia without panic disorder (n=3), social phobia (n=21), 
specific phobia (n=5), obsessive-compulsive disorder (n=6), posttraumatic stress 
disorder (n=23), generalized anxiety disorder (n=10), anorexia nervosa (n=5), 
bulimia nervosa (n=8), eating disorder NOS (n=1), psychotic disorders (n=5), 
substance abuse or dependence (n=22), and adjustment disorder (n=1). 
Materials
Overgeneralization, the tendency to generalize from a bad outcome to the totality 
of one’s self-concept (cf. Beck, 1967; Carver, La Voie, Kuhl, & Ganellen, 1988) was 
measured with the Dutch version of the widely used overgeneralization subscale of 
the Attitudes Towards Self Scale (ATSS) constructed by Van den Heuvel, Derksen, 
Eling, & Van der Staak (in press). The ATSS (Carver & Ganellen, 1983) is a self-report 
questionnaire that assesses overgeneralization to the self, using such items as: 
“When even one thing goes wrong, I begin to feel bad and wonder if I can do well 
at anything at all.” The respondents are asked to indicate the extent of their 
agreement with each of the items along a five-point Likert scale. Van den Heuvel, 
Derksen, Eling, & Van der Staak reported good validity and internal consistency for 
this Dutch measure. The internal consistency coefficient of this scale in the current 
study is reported on the diagonal of table 1. 
 MMPI-2 Low Self-Esteem scale (LSE). To measure level of self-esteem, we used 
the low self-esteem scale (LSE) which is part of the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2: Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & 
Kaemmer, 1989; Dutch translation by Derksen, de Mey, Sloore, & Hellenbosch, 
1993). McCurdy and Kelly (1997) and Brems & Lloyd (1995) reported good concurrent 
validity with different self-esteem measures for this scale. In the current study, 
LSE-scale scores were acquired from the original computer scoring program. 
Therefore Cronbach’s alphas were not available. In table 1 we report the figures 
described by Derksen, de Mey, Sloore, & Hellenbosch (2006) for the Dutch subscale. 
Affect Intensity Measure-Negative Affectivity Scale (AIM-NA).To measure negative 
affect intensity, we used one subscale (Negative Affectivity: AIM_NEG) derived 
from a three-factor model created from the Short Affect Intensity Scale in Dutch by 
Geuens & De Pelsmacker (2002) which was based on the original 40-item AIM by 
Larsen & Diener (1987). The Negative Affectivity-subscale includes 6 items that 
assess the characteristic intensity of negative emotions when they are experienced, 
and each item is rated on a 6-point frequency scale. Geuens & De Pelsmacker 
(2002) reported good validity and adequate internal consistency for this subscale. 
The internal consistency coefficient of this scale in the current study is reported on 
the diagonal of table 1. 
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Psychological Distress: 90-item Symptom Checklist (SCL-90). To measure psychological 
distress we utilized the widely used SCL-90 global severity index of general psycho-
pathology, as measured with the SCL-90 total score (Derogatis, Lipman & Covi, 
1973; Dutch translation by Arrindell & Ettema, 1986). Arrindell & Ettema (1986) 
report good validity and reliability for the Dutch version. Internal consistency for 
the total score in the current study (see table 1) was calculated on the eight 
subdimensions of the SCL-90.
Procedure
Psychological distress and low self-esteem were administered as part of the 
psychological test-assessment for all inpatients of the Scelta Expertise Center. The 
self-report measures for overgeneralization and affect-intensity were administered 
separately. Participants were all assessed in a period of one or two weeks between 
the fourth and tenth week of their admission to the treatment unit (mean length of 
admission to these treatments units is nine months).
rESulTS
The 4 measures in this study were created by making composite scores, i.e. sum 
scores. A missing values analysis reported no missing values for overgeneralization, 
1 missing value for negative affect intensity, 13 missing values for the SCL-90 total 
score, and 28 for the LSE scale in the MMPI-2. Missing values were imputed with 
the EM algorithm, as implemented in the SPSS version 17.0, using all information we 
collected on the participants: 160+ variables, among those variables the MMPI-2 
and the SCL-90 (subscale)scores. The results reported below are based on the 
imputed dataset. The observed means, standard deviations, correlations, and the 
internal consistency coefficients are summarized in table 1. One can see that all 
correlations between the variables are quite high and significant. 
 All models were estimated with LISREL8.80 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1999). We 
used the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation procedure in LISREL8.80 to estimate 
the model parameters. This procedure was applied to the data even though the 
variables were not perfectly normally distributed. Both skewness and kurtosis 
ranged between -0.8 and 0.8, which indicate just a mild violation of normality. In 
addition, robustness studies by Anderson & Amemiya (1988), Satorra & Bentler 
(1990), and Satorra (1992) have shown that the so-called “quasi maximum likelihood” 
estimator, which is LISREL’s implementation of ML, is robust against violations of 
normality under quite general conditions (Saris, Satorra, & Van der Veld, 2009). 
Therefore, the mild normality violations will not seriously affect the parameter 
estimates and standard errors. 
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We did not assume full mediation. Therefore, in both models, we also allowed for 
direct effects between overgeneralization, affect intensity, low self-esteem and 
psychological distress. We expected a correlation between affect intensity and low 
self-esteem. And, we expected all effects and relations to be positive. We estimated 
the models presented in figure 1 and figure 2 with LISREL, the results are presented in 
figure 3 and figure 4. The mediation models are saturated, meaning that the structure 
of the models cannot be tested because the degrees of freedom is zero. What can be 
tested however, are the direct and indirect effects (e.g. Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The 
estimates of the direct effects and their significance are presented in figure 3 and 4. 
The estimates of the indirect effects and tests of their significance cannot be 
presented in the same models, therefore they are presented in table 2.
 The indirect effects in the 1st and 2nd row of table 2 are both not significant. The 
direct effects of AIM_NEG and LSE on SCL-90, see figure 3, are both significant. As 
a consequence we reject the idea that overgeneralization is the mediator.
 The indirect effects in the 3rd and 4th row of table 2 are both significant. In 
addition, the direct effect of ATSS on SCL-90 is not significant as can be seen in 
figure 4. Therefore, we conclude that both affect intensity and low self-esteem 
mediate the relation between overgeneralization and psychological distress. 
Moreover, because the direct effect of ATSS on SCL-90 is not significant, there is full 
mediation (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). And, we find that 28% of the variance of 
SCL-90 is explained by these three variables.
Table 1   Observed means, standard deviations, correlations, and between 
brackets the internal consistency coefficients (diagonal) of the measures 
in this study
SCl-90 lSE AIM_NEG ATSS
SCL-90 (0.87)
LSE 0.45* (0.78a)
AIM_NEG 0.44* 0.42* (0.72)
ATSS 0.37* 0.57* 0.67* (0.85)
Mean 231.94 71.91 4.43 3.82
SD  67.28 13.54   0.86   0.79
Note  SCL-90 = total score of the SCL-90 item symptom checklist; LSE = MMPI-2 Low Self-Esteem Scale; 
AIM_NEG = Affect Intensity Measure-Negative Affectivity Scale; ATSS = overgeneralization subscale of 
the Attitudes Towards Self Scale. 
a The internal consistency is an estimate from a different study with the same measurement 
instrument (Derksen, de Mey, Sloore, & Hellenbosch, 2006), we only had the composite score of the 
measure and could not estimate the internal consistency. 
*  p<0.05
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figure 3  Estimates (left) and standardized estimates (right) for the model in figure 1 a 
* p<.05
a CHI2=0, the model fit is perfect but that is due to the fact that this model is saturated (df=0).
figure 4  Estimates (left) and standardized estimates (right) for the model in figure 2a 
* p<.05
a CHI2=0, the model fit is perfect but that is due to the fact that this model is saturated (df=0).
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DISCuSSION
This study focuses on the nature of the relations between overgeneralization and 
psychological distress in a clinical sample, taking into account the relations with low 
self-esteem and  high affect intensity. Previous studies have provided contradictory 
evidence on the nature of these relations. Several studies suggest that overgener-
alization acts as a mediator, where others suggest that overgeneralization acts as a 
predictor. 
 Our results support the model that regards overgeneralization to be a predictor 
of low self-esteem and affect intensity (see fig. 2). The findings indicate that the 
tendency to overgeneralize (following negative events) has a significant effect on 
both low self-esteem and negative affect intensity. The evidence further supports 
the results from numerous studies that have shown that low self-esteem as well as 
affect intensity have an effect on psychological distress (e.g. Larsen & Diener, 1987; 
Roberts & Monroe, 1994). The findings from the current study extend previous 
research in that they demonstrate that the combination of low self-esteem and 
negative affect intensity fully mediate the effect of overgeneralization on psychological 
distress.
 The findings in the current study back up Linehan’s considerations on the 
emotional mind (1993b) but do not support her thoughts on how the transaction 
between high affect intensity and self-invalidation leads to emotion regulation 
strategies such as overgeneralization, which in turn lead to distress (1993a). After 
all, the mediation effects in the model with overgeneralization as a mediator were 
not significant. The current findings probably correspond best with the perspective 
formulated by Epstein (1992) in his theoretical considerations about the conceptu-
alization of overgeneralization and self-esteem. According to Epstein, it may not be 
difficult to explain why children under certain circumstances develop negative 
self-views. What is more puzzling, is why they maintain their negative self-views in 
Table 2  Estimates and standardized estimates of the indirect effects.
 See Indirect effect Estimate Standardized 
estimate
Figure 3 for this mediation LSE → ATSS → SCL-90 -0.07 -0.01
Figure 3 for this mediation AIM_NEG → ATSS → SCL-90 -1.61 -0.02
Figure 4 for this mediation ATSS → LSE → SCL-90 18.58* 0.22*
Figure 4 for this mediation ATSS → AIM_NEG → SCL-90 16.32* 0.19*
* p<.05
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adulthood, under conditions in which their self-view is clearly incorrect. Epstein 
suggests that people do so, because they overgeneralize in a negatively biased way. 
In this conceptualization, overgeneralization does not result from, but leads to low 
levels of self-esteem, resulting in greater psychological distress. Our results suggest 
exactly this. In addition, our results extend Epstein’s theoretical conceptualization 
to affect intensity. That is, they suggest that high intense negative affect does not 
lead to, but result from negatively biased overgeneralization.
 Several factors limit the generalizability of our study. Most importantly, we 
estimated and tested the models under study with structural equation modelling. 
Due to the correlational nature, we cannot draw conclusions about the causal 
process that creates the correlations between variables in the models. In structural 
equation modelling, there is usually more than one model that can  account for the 
relations between the variables. As a consequence, the acceptance of the second 
model is in favour of the theoretical considerations describing overgeneralization 
as the predictor, but not more than that: the findings support that this theory 
represents one of the possible explanations for the relations between the variables. 
On the other hand, in structural equation modelling, the rejection of a model does 
imply the rejection of the causal hypothesis. This implies that we can conclude that 
overgeneralization is not the mediator. Furthermore, the cross-sectional rather 
than longitudinal assessment precludes a definitive test of the constructs under 
study. Further, the study is mainly based on self-report questionnaires that assess 
the constructs at hand as stable individual characteristics. The question remains 
whether these trait-like constructs represent actual state behaviour. This is 
especially important for the question  how self-esteem plays a role in models of 
vulnerability for psychological distress. According to Roberts & Monroe (1994) this 
vulnerability may result from abnormal levels of low self-esteem, but also from 
highly fluctuating levels of self-esteem. Unfortunately, we were not able to 
incorporate a proper measurement of the latter factor in this study. Future studies 
may include measurements of both level of self-esteem and the fluctuation of 
self-esteem. 
 One of the strengths of this paper is that we studied overgeneralization, 
self-esteem, affect intensity, and psychological distress in a clinical population. To 
our knowledge, this is the first study in that respect. As argued in the introduction, 
we believe that the personality disordered sample we chose, was especially 
appropriate to investigate the effect of the concepts under study. However, future 
studies may include different patient groups as well as non-patients, to investigate 
whether the role of overgeneralization is comparable for all groups or whether 
overgeneralization works differently in specific groups. Unfortunately, in this study 
the sample size was not large enough to create subgroups, representing different 
diagnostic categories. Likewise, gender imbalance prevented separate analyses. 
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This also seems important for future research to evaluate.
 The findings in this study suggest that clinicians should surely focus on the 
treatment of their patients’ low self-esteem and the high intensity of their emotions. 
But in order to get more grip on high affect intensity and low self-esteem, clinicians 
should also focus on the treatment of their patients’ overgeneralizing cognitive 
style, especially in patients suffering from a personality disorder. Hayes, Harris, & 
Carver (2004) already stressed, that targeting negative overgeneralization in 
psychotherapy would be particularly useful for preventing relapse of depression, 
given their findings that formerly depressed individuals endorse higher degrees of 
negative overgeneralization in a non-patient sample. Our findings are in line with 
this advice for a clinical population. In this respect, it is noteworthy that Watkins, 
Baeyens, & Read (2009) recently developed a training procedure that proved to be 
successful in bringing down levels of overgeneralization in a non-patient population. 
It will be a goal for future work on this topic to examine the effect of such training 
in a clinical population. 
Ch
ap
te
r 
 3
O
ve
rg
en
er
al
iz
at
io
n 
an
d 
ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
l d
is
tr
es
s 
in
 a
 c
lin
ic
al
 p
op
ul
at
io
n:
 t
he
 m
ed
ia
ti
ng
 r
ol
e 
of
 a
ff
ec
t 
in
te
ns
it
y 
an
d 
se
lf
-e
st
ee
m
63
rEfErENCES 
Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M. E. P., & Teasdale, J. D. (1978). Learned helplessness in humans: Critique and 
reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49-74.
Anderson, T. W., & Amemiya, Y. (1988). The asymptotic normal distribution of estimators in factor analysis 
under general conditions. The Annals of Statistics, 16, 759–771.
Arrindell, W. A., & Ettema, J. H. M. (1986). SCL-90 : Handleiding bij een multidimensionale psychopathologie- 
indicator. [SCL-90: Manual to a multidimensional psychopatholgy indicator.] Lisse: Swets Test Services.
Baumeister, R. F., Tice, D. M., & Hutton, D. G. (1989). Self-presentational motivations and personality 
differences in self-esteem. Journal of Personality, 57, 547–579.
Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression: Clinical, experimental, and theoretical aspects. New York: Harper & Row.
Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. New York: International Universities Press.
Beck, A. T., Brown, G. K., Steer, R. A., Kuyken, W., & Grisham, J. (2001). Psychometric properties of the Beck 
Self-Esteem Scales. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 39(1),115-124.
Brems, C., & Lloyd, P. (1995). Validation of the MMPI-2 low self-esteem content scale. Journal of Personality 
Assessment, 65(3), 550-556.
Butcher, J. N., Dahlstrom, W. G., Graham, J. R., Tellegen, A., & Kaemmer, B. (1989). Manual for the 
restandardized Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory: MMPI-2. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press.
Brown, J. D., & Dutton, K. A. (1995). The thrill of victory, the complexity of defeat: self-esteem and people’s 
emotional reactions to success and failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 712-722.
Brown, J. D., & Gallagher, F. M. (1992). Coming to terms with failure: Private self-enhancement and public 
self-effacement. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 28, 3–22.
Butler, A. C., Hokanson, J. E., & Flynn, H. A. (1994). A comparison of self-esteem lability and low trait 
self-esteem as vulnerability factors for depression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
66(1), 166-177.
Carver, C. S. (1998). Generalization, adverse events, and development of depressive symptoms. Journal of 
Personality, 66, 607-619.
Carver, C.S., Ganellen, R.J., & Behar-Mitrani, V. (1985). Depression and cognitive style: Comparisons 
between measures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 674-685.
Carver, C. S., & Ganellen, R. J. (1983). Depression and components of self-punitiveness: High standards, 
self-criticism, and overgeneralization. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 92, 330-337.
Carver, C. S., LaVoie, L., Kuhl, J., & Ganellen, R. J. (1988). Cognitive concomitants of depression: A further 
examination of the roles of generalization, high standards and self-criticism. Journal of Social and 
Clinical Psychology, 7, 350-365.
Derksen, J., de Mey, H., Sloore, H., & Hellenbosch, H. (2006). MMPI-2: Handleiding voor afname, scoring en 
interpretatie. [MMPI-2: Manual for testing, scoring and interpretation.] Nijmegen: PEN Tests Publisher.
Derksen, J., de Mey, H., Sloore, H., & Hellenbosch, H. (1993). MMPI-2. Handleiding bij afname, scoring en 
interpretatie. [MMPI-2: Manual for testing, scoring and interpretation.] Nijmegen: PEN Tests Publisher.
Derogatis, L. R., Lipman, R. S., & Covi, L. (1973). SCL-90, an outpatient psychiatric rating scale: Preliminary 
report. Psychopharmacology Bulletin, 9, 13-28.
Dizen, M. (2006). Cognitive and motivational correlates of affect intensity and affect variability. Expectations 
for and perceptions of self and others. Dissertation Abstracts International: section B, 66 (12B), 6962.
Dritschel, B .H., & Teasdale, J. D. (1991). Individual differences in affect-related cognitive operations elicited 
by experimental stimuli. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 30, 151-160.
Dritschel, B. H., Williams, K., & Cooper, P. J. (1991). Cognitive distortions amongst women experiencing 
bulimic episodes. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 10, 547-555.
Dykman, B. M. (1996). Negative self-evaluations among dysphoric college students: A difference in degree 
or kind? Cognitive Therapy and Research, 20, 445-464.
Epkins, C. C. (1996). Cognitive specificity and affective confounding in social anxiety and dysphoria in 
children. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 18, 83-101.
64
Epstein, S. (1992). Coping ability, negative self-evaluation, and overgeneralization: Experiment and theory. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 826-836.
First, M. B., Spitzer, R. L., Gibbon, M., & Williams, J. B. (1997). Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis 
I Disorders. New York: New York State Psychiatric Institute.
First, M. B., Spitzer, R. L., Gibbon, M., Williams, G. B. W., & Benjamin, L. (1994). Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders. New York: New York State Psychiatric Institute.
Flett, G. L., Blankstein, K. R., & Obertynski, M. (1995). Affect intensity, coping styles, mood regulation 
expectancies, and depressive symptoms. Personality and Individual Differences, 20(2), 221-228.
Flett, G. L., Hewitt, P. L., & Mittelstaedt, W. L. (1991). Dysphoria and components of self-punitiveness: A 
re-analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 15, 201-219.
Ganellen, R. J. (1988). Specificity of attributions and overgeneralization in depression and anxiety. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 97, 83-86.
Geuens, M., & De Pelsmacker, P. (2002). Developing a short Affect Intensity scale. Psychological Reports, 
91, 657-670.
Groenestijn, M. A. C., Akkerhuis, G. W., Kupka, R. W., Schneider, N., & Nolen, W. A. (1999). Gestructureerd 
klinisch interview voor de vaststelling van DSM-IV as I stoornissen. [Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSM-IV Axis I Disorders]. Lisse, The Netherlands: Swets & Zeitlinger.
Hayes, A. M., Harris, M. S., & Carver, C. S. (2004). Predictors of self-esteem variability. Cognitive Therapy 
and Research, 28(3), 369-385.
Ilardi, S. S., & Craighead, W. E. (1999). The relationship between personality pathology and dysfunctional 
cognitions in previously depressed adults. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108, 51-57.
Jöreskog, K. G., & Sörbom, D. (1999). LISREL 8 User’s Reference Guide. Second Edition. Lincolnwood: 
Scientific Software International.
Kernis, M. H., Brockner, J., & Frankel, B. S. (1989). Self-esteem and reactions to failure: The mediating role 
of overgeneralization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 707-714.
Kernis, M. H., Granneman, B. D., & Mathis, L. C. (1991). Stability of self-esteem as a moderator of the 
relation between level of self-esteem and depression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
61, 80-84.
Klar, Y., Gabai, T., & Baron, Y. (1997). Depression and generalization about the future: who overgeneralizes 
what? Personality and Individual Differences, 22, 575-584.
Larsen, R. J. (1989). A process approach to personality psychology: Utilizing time as a facet of data. In D. M. 
Buss, & N. Cantor (Eds.), Personality psychology: Recent trends and emerging directions (pp. 177–193). 
New York: Springer.
Larsen R. J. (2000). Toward a Science of Mood Regulation. Psychological Inquiry 11(3), 129-141.
Larsen, R. J., Billings, D., & Cutler, S. (1996). Affect intensity and individual differences in cognitive style. 
Journal of Personality, 64, 185-208.
Larsen, R. J., & Diener, E. (1987). Affect intensity as an individual difference characteristic: A review. Journal 
of Research in Personality, 21, 1-39.
Larsen, R. J., Diener, E., & Cropanzano, R. (1987). Cognitive operations associated with individual differences 
in affect intensity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 767-774.
Levine, D., Marziali, E., & Hood, J. (1997). Emotion processing in borderline personality disorders. The 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 185, 240-246.
Linehan, M. M. (1993a). Cognitive behavioural Treatment for Borderline Personality Disorder. New York: 
Guilford Publications. 
Linehan, M. M. (1993b). Skills Training Manual for Treating Borderline Personality Disorder. New York: 
Guilford Publications. 
McCurdy, B. A., & Kelly, D. B. (1997). Correlations of the MMPI-2 low self-esteem scale with two self-esteem 
measures. Psychological Reports, 81(3), 826-826.
Oosterwegel, A., Field, N., Hart, D., & Anderson, K. (2001). The relation of self-esteem variability to emotion 
variability, mood, personality traits, and depressive tendencies. Journal of Personality, 69(5), 
689-708.
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect effects in simple 
mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36(4), 717-731.
Ch
ap
te
r 
 3
O
ve
rg
en
er
al
iz
at
io
n 
an
d 
ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
l d
is
tr
es
s 
in
 a
 c
lin
ic
al
 p
op
ul
at
io
n:
 t
he
 m
ed
ia
ti
ng
 r
ol
e 
of
 a
ff
ec
t 
in
te
ns
it
y 
an
d 
se
lf
-e
st
ee
m
65
Roberts, J. E., & Monroe, S. M. (1994). A multidimensional model of self-esteem in depression, Clinical 
Psychology Review,14, 161-181. 
Saris, W. E., Satorra, A., & Van der Veld, W. M. (2009). Testing Structural Equation Models or Detection of 
Misspecifications? Structural Equation Modeling. A multidisciplinary journal, 16(4), 561-582.
Satorra, A. (1992). Asymptotic robust inferences in the analysis of mean and covariance Structures. 
Sociological Methodology, 22, 249–278.
Satorra, A., & Bentler, P. M. (1990). Model conditions for asymptotic robustness in the analysis of linear 
relations. Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, 10, 235-249.
Van den Heuvel, T. J., Derksen, J. J. L., Eling, P. A. T. M., & Van der Staak, C. P. F. (in press). An investigation 
of different aspects of overgeneralization in patients with major depressive disorder and borderline 
personality disorder. British Journal of Clinical Psychology.
Van den Heuvel, T. J., Eling, P. A. T. M., Derksen, J .J. L., & Van der Staak, C. P. F. (2012). Overgeneralization 
training intensifies emotional reactivity: A cognitive bias modification approach. Manuscript 
submitted for publication.
Watkins, E. R., Baeyens, C. B., & Read, R. (2009). Concreteness training reduces dysphoria: proof-of-princi-
ple for repeated cognitive bias modification in depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 118(1), 
55-64.
Weems, C. F., Berman, S. L., Silverman, W., & Saavedra, L. M. (2001). Cognitive errors in youth with anxiety 
disorders: The linkages between negative cognitive errors and anxious symptoms. Cognitive Therapy 
and Research, 25, 559-575.
Weertman, A., Arntz, A., Dreessen, L., van Velzen, C., & Vertommen, S. (2003). Short-interval test-retest 
interrater reliability of the Dutch version of the structured clinical interview for DSM-IV personality 
disorders (SCID II). Journal of Personality Disorders, 17(6), 562-567.
Wenzlaff, P. M. & Grozier, S. A. (1988). Depression and the magnification of failure. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 97, 90-93.
Yen, S., Zlotnick, C., & Costello, E. (2002). Affect regulation in women with borderline personality disorder 
traits. The journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 190, 693-696.
Zeigler-Hill, V., & Abraham, J. (2006). Borderline personality features: Instability of self-esteem and affect. 
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 25(6), 668-687.

CH
A
P
TE
r 4
Overgeneralization training intensifies 
emotional reactivity: A cognitive bias 
modification approach
Van den Heuvel, T.J., Eling, P.A.T.M., Van der Staak, C.P.F., & Derksen, J.J.L. 
(2012). Overgeneralizati on training intensifi es emoti onal reacti vity: A cogniti ve 
bias modifi cati on approach. 
Manuscript submitt ed for publicati on.
68
ABSTrACT
Objective. The present study aimed to develop an experimental paradigm to 
investigate whether training can induce overgeneralization that is situation-focused 
and associative, in contrast to self-focused and focused on analytical, interpretative, 
evaluative processing. A further aim was to examine whether this processing mode 
influences emotional reactivity. 
Methods. 69 participants were randomly allocated either to (a) overgeneralization 
training, (b) specification training, matched with overgeneralization training for 
training rationale, experimenter contact, and training duration but in which 
participants had to focus on the emotional cue; or (c) a free association control 
condition. Emotional reactivity was assessed in general mood assessments at the 
beginning and the end of the experiment, and by measuring immediate affective 
reactions to emotional cues. 
results. The induction method was successful but faded away quickly. Nevertheless, 
findings show that overgeneralization training led to significantly more intense 
reactions to affective stimuli in terms of the arousal that was experienced, and we 
found some indications of an effect on mood. 
Conclusions. The paradigm can be used to further investigate positive and negative 
associative, situation-focused overgeneralization and its influence on emotional 
reactivity. The findings are relevant to cognitive theories of depression and other 
psychological disorders, and offer further support for a possible intrinsical relation 
between overgeneralization and emotional reactivity. 
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INTrODuCTION
Overgeneralization refers to generalization that is inappropriate, because it is excessive 
(Epstein, 1992) or unjustified (Beck, 1976). A person who overgeneralizes, fails to 
make important discriminations and therefore arrives at incorrect conclusions and 
draws inappropriate lessons from experience. Various studies have provided 
evidence that overgeneralization is related to depression and depressive mood 
states (e.g., Carver, 1998; Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Flett, Hewitt & Mittelstaedt, 
1991; Ganellen, 1988). In a longitudinal research design, overgeneralization predicted 
the development of depressive symptoms (Carver, 1998; Dykman, 1996). Also, 
evidence was found that overgeneralization is associated with slower recovery 
from dysphoric mood states (Edelman, Ahrens & Haaga, 1994). Additionally, 
depression is characterized by the overgenerality of autobiographical memories, 
characterized by summaries of globally described events that lack specificity 
(Williams et al., 2007). Overgeneral memory retrieval predicts delayed recovery 
from episodes of affective disorders (Williams et al., 2007). 
 Watkins and Teasdale (2001) suggested that overgeneral memory in depression 
may be associated with ruminative attempts to make sense of current or past 
difficulties. They investigated which component of rumination was responsible for 
the effect of rumination on overgeneral memory and found that an overgeneral 
processing mode characterized by a highly analytical, evaluative self-focus maintained 
overgeneral memory whereas a processing mode low in analytical thinking reduced 
overgeneral memory. Rimes and Watkins (2005) found that the induction of an 
analytical, evaluative self-focus is associated with increased levels of global self-
judgements in dysphoric patients and that this may influence depressed mood. 
They claim that the categoric nature of overgeneral memory not only overlaps with 
global self-judgments but also with other forms of overgeneral thinking found in 
depression which predict future depressive symptoms, such as overgeneralization. 
They also explicitly state that categoric memories are distinct from overgeneraliza-
tion, as far as memories that do not involve self-evaluations (e.g. ‘playing football 
every Sunday”) are concerned. 
 Watkins, Moberly, and Moulds (2008) reported evidence that explicit as well as 
implicit inductions of an analytic, evaluative self-focused processing mode modifies 
emotional reactivity. Watkins and Moberly (2009) argued, that if an abstract-over-
general processing mode leads to an increase of negative affect, then a concrete 
processing mode should lead to a decrease of negative affect. In a cognitive bias 
modification paradigm, they trained dysphoric individuals to become more concrete 
and specific in their thinking. Indeed, their training procedure led to a decrease of 
rumination and a reduction of depressive symptoms. Watkins, Baeyens, and Read 
(2009) compared repeated sessions of this concreteness training with a bogus 
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training condition and a waiting-list control condition in a dysphoric sample. They 
found concreteness training to have a greater effect on depressive symptoms than 
the other interventions. However, although concreteness training did reduce 
self-reported self-criticism, it did not produce a significantly greater change on 
self-reported overgeneralization than the other conditions. 
 The studies of Watkins and colleagues provide strong evidence that overgeneral 
thinking can be successfully modified and that such modification influences 
rumination and depressive symptoms. The fact, however, that their intervention 
had an effect on depressive symptoms, rumination and on self-reported self-
criticism, but not on self-reported overgeneralization leads to the question whether 
the overgeneral processing mode they induced is the same as the processing mode 
responsible for the effect of overgeneralization. Watkins and his coworkers make a 
strong case for the suggestion that this overgeneral processing mode involves (a) a 
focus on self-experience; and (b) a focus on analytical, evaluative processing. These 
are the same two components that Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (as cited in 
Watkins & Teasdale, 2001) found to be characteristic for rumination. However, 
several authors have argued that overgeneralization is not restricted to self-related 
content. For example, Epstein (1992) and Carver and Ganellen (1983) distinguished 
two ways of defining and measuring overgeneralization. One is the presence of 
 unrealistically broad attributions about the self (“overgeneralization to the self”). 
The other is the presence of overly broad attributions in response to specific 
situations (“overgeneralization across situations”). MacLeod & Williams (1990) 
provide evidence for the heterogeneity of the overgeneralization-concept on the 
basis of a study, in which they found no significant correlation between two over-
generalization-scales, representing the two definitions. Van den Heuvel, Derksen, 
Eling and Van der Staak (in press) present findings that overgeneralization in 
individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) is not restricted to misattribu-
tions directed at the self, but extends to misattributions directed at situations in the 
outside world and that the two types of overgeneralization act slightly different in 
different populations. More specifically, individuals diagnosed with borderline 
personality disorder (BPD) showed different patterns of situation-focused over-
generalization in comparison to non-patient controls. These findings suggest that 
the overgeneral processing mode underlying overgeneralization involves self- 
focused as well as situation-focused processing.
 The second component of the overgeneral processing mode, defined by 
Watkins c.s., as a focus on the analysis of the causes, meanings and consequences 
of one’s symptoms and feelings, may be an essential aspect of rumination, but not 
necessarily of overgeneralization. The overgeneral processing mode is worked out 
by Watkins and his collaborators as a bias of interpretation or judgment. However, 
Power and Dalgleish (1997) point out that , though cognitive biases can occur in 
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cognitive processing at a high level of semantic representation in which appraisal, 
interpretation, evaluation and analysis take place, they also occur in a lower, more 
implicit, level of associative cognitive processing. We reasoned that the overgener-
alization concept essentially refers to the notion that one single emotional 
experience activates an entire collection of emotional experiences (in past, present 
or future) that somehow becomes equivalent or even equal to this one experience. 
In other words, for a person who is overgeneralizing, one emotional experience 
becomes ‘prototypical’ for all experiences of that kind. This kind of overgeneralization 
is not necessarily related to the self, but may also be contextual or stimulus-specific. 
Also, it is not necessarily based on higher-level inferential, interpretative processes 
or analyses of causes, meanings and consequences but simply on a lower-level 
digressive associative style.
 
The first aim of the present study was to develop an experimental paradigm to 
investigate an overgeneral processing mode that is situation-focused and 
associative, in contrast to self-focused and focused on interpretative, analytical, 
evaluative processing. To create an induction of overgeneralization that is situa-
tion-focused and associative, we instructed participants in the experimental Over-
generalization condition to look at stimulus slides and focus on their feelings. 
Subsequently, they were trained to name as many associations they could think of 
that evoked the same feelings as the picture on each slide. In order to induce over-
generalization not focused on analytical, interpretative, evaluative processing of an 
event or action, participants were instructed not to go into stories but instead just 
name associations. 
 We used a design with two control conditions. Participants in a first control 
condition – Specification condition - were instructed to look at the stimulus-slide, to 
focus on their feelings, subsequently concentrate exclusively on the picture, and 
name as many features of the picture they could think of. In this control condition, 
the participants had to focus on the emotional cue, in contrast to the participants 
in the experimental condition who had to focus on their digressing associations. 
Participants in a second control condition – Free Association condition – were 
instructed to look at the stimulus-slide, to focus on their feelings and subsequently 
just say everything that came to mind. This control condition was created as a 
baseline control condition in which there was no specific focus on the emotional 
cue, nor on the associations they evoked. We instructed participants in all conditions 
to focus on their feelings, to make sure that emotional experience was activated 
and to be sure that we did not accidentally tap on a difference in the focus 
participants would have on their feelings due to the training they received. 
 A pilot study had provided evidence that participants produced different 
manifestations of overgeneralization in reaction to our training procedures. 
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Therefore, to examine which types of overgeneralization were produced by 
the participants in the different training conditions, we counted two different 
manifestations of associative situation-focused overgeneralization: (1) simple over-
generalizations, operationalized as associations of events or experiences that are 
not visible in the stimulus slide and contain a specific person, time or place (e.g. 
‘that makes me think of the trip to India last year, when we were scared by a snake’; 
‘that makes me think of the party where I met my boyfriend’), and (2) categoric 
overgeneralizations, operationalized as associations of events or experiences not 
visible in the picture that are not specific in terms of person, time or place, but 
represent a summary or category of experiences (e.g. ‘that makes me think of 
vacation’; ‘that makes me think of war’). Besides, we counted one manifestation of 
interpretative, evaluative overgeneralization: interpretative overgeneralizations, 
operationalized as interpretative, evaluative statements about people or the world 
as a whole (e.g. ‘all men are pigs’, ‘people always fight’). 
 The second aim of the current study was to investigate whether an increase 
in associative, situation-focused overgeneralization would influence emotional 
reactivity. Emotional reactivity is conceptualized as the change in the quality and 
intensity of affect in response to an emotionally evocative event (e.g. Watkins, 
Moberly  & Moulds, 2008). In the current study, emotional reactivity was assessed in 
general mood assessments at the beginning and the end of the experiment, and by 
measuring immediate affective reaction in arousal and emotional valence immediately 
after each emotional cue. Since we designed this study bearing BPD patients in mind, 
we were, next to the valence of affective reactions, especially interested in the 
intensity of affective reaction. This research question is related to the work of Larsen 
and his coworkers (Larsen, Diener & Emmons, 1986; Larsen & Diener, 1987; Larsen, 
Diener & Cropanzano, 1987; Dritschel & Teasdale, 1991) on  overgeneralization and 
high affect intensity. The central assumption underlying these studies was that over-
generalization leads individuals to interpret affective stimuli in a manner that 
intensifies the affective response to those stimuli (Larsen et al., 1996). The hypothesis 
that an increase of overgeneralization would lead to higher affect intensity, though, 
was not tested directly. In the current study, we did exactly this. 
 Finally, since according to DSM-IV criteria (APA, 1994) BPD patients differ from 
MDD patients not only in the intensity of their affects, but also in the range of their 
emotions (not only dysphoria but also irritability, anxiety and anger) and over-
generalization might influence some specific emotions differently than others, we 
also included a measure for specific emotions. 
 We predicted that the participants in the overgeneralization-condition would 
produce more simple and categoric overgeneralizations than the participants in the 
control conditions but not interpretative overgeneralizations. Next, we predicted 
that compared to specification-training, overgeneralization training would influence 
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emotional reactivity, in line with the findings of Watkins, Moberly and Moulds 
(2008) and Watkins, Baeyens, and Read (2009). And, from the literature on affect 
intensity (e.g. Larsen & Diener, 1987), we predicted that participants that received 
the overgeneralization training would show significantly greater increases of the 
intensity of their immediate affective reaction after each cue than participants in 
the two control conditions. We made no specific predictions concerning the 
influence of overgeneralization training to the different specific emotions .
METHOD
Participants
A total of 73 psychology students participated in this study. The data of four 
participants were discarded because of missing values so that 69 participants 
remained. The mean age was 23.4 years (range 18-30). The sample included 23 
males and 46 females. Participants had no knowledge of the research topic and 
participated in exchange for course credit. The participants were randomly allocated 
either to overgeneralization training (n=24), specification training (n=22), or free 
association (n=23). No significant age or gender differences were found between 
the groups in a one-way ANOVA (resp. F(2,70)= .755, n.s. and F(2,70)= .348, n.s.).
PrOCEDurE
The experiment had 6 phases (A to F) (see figure 1). In phase A, participants rated 
their general mood-state in terms of arousal and valence, the experienced intensity 
of their specific emotions and the extent of depressed mood. We used Self-Assess-
ment Manikins (SAM; Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert, 2001) to get ratings of the 
valence and arousal dimensions of the participants’ mood. Ratings ranged  from 1 
to 9 on each dimension on a 9-point Likert scale (i.e., from feeling extremely 
unpleasant to very pleasant, and from a state of very low arousal to very high 
arousal). To get ratings of specific emotions, we used the same 9-point Likert scales 
to assess  the five basic emotions as defined by Power and Dalgleish (1997): fear, 
anger, happiness, sadness and disgust. The Dutch version of the Depression 
Adjective Check Lists (DACL; Lubin, 1965), was used to get an estimate of depressed 
mood. Reliability and validity of the Dutch version of this instrument are good 
(Arrindell & Van Rooijen, 1999). We used the two versions of the list to assess 
pretest and posttest depressed mood. 
 Then, in the pretest phase for affective reaction (phase B), participants were 
shown pictures full screen in a Powerpoint slideshow, on a 17 inch monitor in a 
74
fi
gu
re
 1
  P
ha
se
s 
in
 t
he
 e
xp
er
im
en
ta
l p
ro
ce
du
re
Ph
as
e
A
B
C
D
E
f
O
bj
ec
t
G
en
er
al
 m
oo
d 
st
at
e
Pr
et
es
t
A
ff
ec
ti
ve
 
re
ac
ti
on
Pr
et
es
t
Tr
ai
ni
ng
co
nd
iti
on
A
ff
ec
ti
ve
 
re
ac
ti
on
Po
stt
es
t
A
ss
es
sm
en
t o
f n
um
be
r
of
 o
ve
rg
en
er
al
iz
ati
on
s
G
en
er
al
 m
oo
d 
st
at
e
Po
stt
es
t
M
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
SA
M
 a
ro
us
al
SA
M
 v
al
en
ce
Fe
ar
A
ng
er
H
ap
pi
ne
ss
Sa
dn
es
s
D
is
gu
st
D
AC
L
SA
M
 a
ro
us
al
SA
M
 v
al
en
ce
Fe
ar
A
ng
er
H
ap
pi
ne
ss
Sa
dn
es
s
D
is
gu
st
O
ve
rg
en
er
al
iz
ati
on
O
r
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
O
r
Fr
ee
 a
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
SA
M
 a
ro
us
al
SA
M
 v
al
en
ce
Fe
ar
A
ng
er
H
ap
pi
ne
ss
Sa
dn
es
s
D
is
gu
st
A
ud
io
ta
pe
 r
ati
ng
s
SA
M
 a
ro
us
al
SA
M
 v
al
en
ce
Fe
ar
A
ng
er
H
ap
pi
ne
ss
Sa
dn
es
s
D
is
gu
st
D
AC
L
N
o
te
. S
A
M
 =
 S
el
f-
A
ss
es
sm
en
t 
M
an
ik
in
; D
A
C
L 
= 
D
ep
re
ss
io
n 
A
dj
ec
ti
ve
 C
he
ck
 L
is
ts
.
Ch
ap
te
r 
 4
O
ve
rg
en
er
al
iz
at
io
n 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 in
te
ns
if
ie
s 
em
ot
io
na
l r
ea
ct
iv
it
y:
 a
 c
og
ni
ti
ve
 b
ia
s 
m
od
if
ic
at
io
n 
ap
pr
oa
ch
75
mildly darkened room. Stimulus materials consisted of digitized photographs from 
the International Affective Picture System (CSEA-NIMH, 1999). We created 10 
different categories of affective pictures: five pleasant (romantic couples, children, 
cute animals, exciting sports, impressively beautiful landscape) and five unpleasant 
(maltreatment, injury, scary animals, snakes, dingy sights).  All categories contained 
seven pictures, which were matched for valence and arousal ratings based on the 
original ratings by Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert (2001). Pictures from each category 
were shown in blocks of ten, one of each category in every block. They were shown 
in random order, the only restriction being that pleasant and unpleasant pictures 
were shown alternately. All participants were shown the same pictures in identical 
order. Each slide was preceded for 3 seconds by the instruction “Look first and 
concentrate on your feelings. When you hear a tone, fill in the accompanying 
scales.” Then, after a click, the slide was shown for 10 seconds, followed by a black 
screen for 5 seconds. Then a tone sounded, the instruction “now fill in the scales for 
this slide” appeared on the black screen and participants had 15 seconds to rate 
their affective reaction to this particular slide on the same ratings scales that were 
used in the general mood assessment, except for the DACL. During these 15 seconds, 
the screen remained black. After three practice slides, participants rated their 
emotional reactions to one block of 10 slides. 
 After this pretest phase, the training phase (C) started. In this phase, which 
contained 20 stimulus slides, all subgroups received instructions to look at the 
picture and concentrate on their feelings. Each slide was shown for 10 seconds, 
followed by a black screen for 5 seconds. Then the exact instruction was given, 
again followed by a black screen and the participants were asked to think aloud for 
20 seconds. The Overgeneralization subgroup received the instruction: “First look 
and concentrate on your feelings. After the tone, name as many associations you 
can think of, that raise the same feelings.” The Specification subgroup received the 
instruction: “First look and concentrate on your feelings. After the tone, describe 
the picture and the accompanying feelings as good as possible.” The Free Association 
subgroup received the instruction: “First look and concentrate on your feelings. 
After the tone, say everything that comes to mind.” The first three slides were 
shown with an extensive explanation and some examples of what was expected. 
During the training, a trainer shaped the desired cognitive behavior by making 
remarks like ‘that is what we mean’, ‘that’s not what we mean’, and ‘are there any 
other associations that raise the same feelings you can think of?’ (overgeneraliza-
tion-condition) or ‘can you think of more things you saw in the picture?” (specifica-
tion-condition) or ‘can you think of anything else?’ (free association-condition). The 
training phase was recorded on audiotape. 
 After the training phase, a posttest phase for affective reaction followed (phase D). 
Phase D was similar to pretest phase B but with a different set of pictures. The two 
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sets of pictures that were used in phase B and D were alternated between the 
participants in such a manner that half the participants in each group was shown 
one order, while the other half was shown the opposite order. 
 In the next phase (E), participants again were shown 10 slides and were asked 
to speak out loud everything they thought, so that the (lasting) effect of the training 
could be assessed. This control phase was also recorded on audiotape. Phase F was 
a posttest phase for the participants’ general-mood-state. 
 The tape-recordings were rated by two trained raters who were unaware of the 
group membership of the participants on the tape. Simple, categoric and 
interpretative overgeneralizations were counted at three moments in time: (I) at 
the end of the training-procedure C, directly before the posttest phase D (picture 
C17 to C20), (II) immediately after the posttest phase D at the start of control phase 
E(picture E1 to E4), and (III) at the end of phase E (picture E7 to E10).
rESulTS
Training-effects: number of overgeneralizations. 
Nine tape recordings were excluded from the analysis due to bad sound quality. 
In order to estimate interrater reliability, Pearson correlations between the two 
raters’ ratings were computed for the three types of overgeneralization: simple 
overgeneralizations: r=.92, p<.001; categoric overgeneralizations: r=.94, p<.001; 
interpretative overgeneralizations: r=.82, p<.001. Because the interrater correlations 
were so high, the ratings of the two raters were averaged prior to subsequent 
analyses. 
To investigate whether (a) the training procedures were successful and (b) whether 
the effect of the manipulation had lasted long enough to assume that changes in 
affective responses before and after the training could be ascribed to this training-
effect, first a repeated measures MANOVA was performed on number of overgen-
eralizations for the three types of overgeneralization, with Slide valence (pleasant-
unpleasant) and Time (end of phase C, start of phase E, end of phase E) as within 
subject variables and Group as between subjects variable. Multivariate tests 
revealed main effects for Group (F(6,116)=4.692, p<.001, ηp
2=.195), Slide valence(F(3,58)= 
18.685, p<.001, ηp
2=.491) and Time (F(6,55)=4.928, p<.001, ηp
2=.350), an interaction 
effect for Time and Group (F(12,110)=2.089, p=.023, ηp
2=.186) and no significant 
Slide valence by Group interaction. Univariate tests revealed main effects for Group 
on simple overgeneralizations (F(2,60)=9.702, p<.001, ηp
2=.244), and categoric 
overgeneralizations (F(2,60)=5.320, p=.007, ηp
2=.151), but not for interpretative 
overgeneralizations. Contrast analyses revealed that the overgeneralization (OG) 
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group  showed more simple overgeneralizations after training than the specification 
(SP) group and the free association (FA) group (resp. p<.001 and p=.002), but that 
the latter two groups did not differ significantly from each other. Also, the OG group 
showed more categoric overgeneralizations than the SP group (p=.002), but did not 
differ significantly from the FA group (see table 1). 
 To ascertain that the OG group actually differed in the amount in which they 
generated simple c.q. categoric overgeneralizations at the moment of testing 
affective reaction (phase D), and because Time and Group showed an interaction 
effect, we conducted ANOVAs in order to assess simple effects for each phase 
separately. We found main effects for simple as well as categoric overgeneraliza-
tions at the end of training phase C (resp. F(2,60)=25.282, p<.001, ηp
2=.457 and 
F(2,60)=13.160, p<.001, ηp
2=.305). Contrast-analyses revealed significantly higher 
simple as well as categoric overgeneralization in the OG group than in the other two 
groups (simple overgeneralizations: SP vs. OG: p<.001; FA vs. OG: p<.001; categoric 
overgeneralizations: SP vs. OG: p<.001; FA vs. OG: p=.021). At the start of phase E, 
participants in the OG group produced more simple overgeneralizations than the 
other two groups (main effect for Group: F(2,60)=4.035, p=.023, ηp
2=.119), contrast 
1: SP vs. OG: p=.019, contrast 2: FA vs. OG: p=.015), but they did not differ in the 
amount of categoric overgeneralizations any more. At the end of phase E, the 
difference between the groups was not significant any more. From these findings 
we can conclude that during the test-phase D, the OG group showed more simple 
overgeneralization than the other two groups. We cannot be certain whether this 
also holds for categoric overgeneralization. Groups certainly did not differ on 
interpretative overgeneralization as this type of overgeneralization was hardly 
observed in any of the groups. 
Emotional reactivity, affective reaction: arousal and valence pre- and post-training. 
To investigate whether the overgeneralization-training led to more intense affective 
reactions, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for the SAM ratings of 
emotional arousal with Slide valence (pleasant-unpleasant) and Time (before 
(phase B) and after the training (phase D)) as within subject variables and Group as 
between subjects variable. Means and standard deviations are presented in table 2. 
Analyses revealed a significant main effect for Slide valence (F(1,66)=15.808, p<.001, 
ηp
2=.193) but no significant interaction effect for Slide valence and Group. 
Participants reacted with more arousal to unpleasant than to pleasant slides and 
this holds for all groups. As expected a significant main effect was found for Time 
(F(1,66)=10.904, p=.002, ηp
2=.142) as well as for the interaction of Time and Group 
(F(2,66)=3.459, p=.037, ηp
2=.095), but no significant main effect for Group. There 
was also no significant Group by Time by Slide valence interaction. Contrast analyses 
revealed that the OG group reported a larger change in arousal from phase B to 
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phase D than the SP group (p=.018) and the FA group (p=.043). Subsequently, 
paired-samples t-tests were performed for each group separately with mean levels 
of arousal for all slides, and for pleasant and unpleasant slides separately. Since we 
used a repeated measures design, effect sizes (Cohen’s d) were calculated 
conservatively with the original pooled standard deviations (see Dunlop, Cortina, 
Vaslow, & Burke, 1996). As can be seen in table 2, the subjects trained to 
overgeneralize, indicate significantly higher levels of arousal in reaction to the 
stimulus slides after the training than they did before the training, the effect size is 
medium to large (t(23)= -3.45, p= .002; d= .56) and this holds for positive as well as 
negative slides (resp. t(23)= -2.69, p= .013; d= .50 and t(23)= -3.43, p= .002; d= .50). 
Both the subjects trained to specify and to free associate show no differences in 
their levels of arousal in reaction to the slides before and after the training.
 Next, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for the SAM ratings of 
emotional valence with Slide valence (pleasant-unpleasant) and Time (before 
(phase B) and after the training (phase D)) as within subject variables and Group as 
between subjects variable. Means and standard deviations are presented in table 2. 
Results show a main effect for Slide valence (F(1,67)=272.621, p<.001, ηp
2=.803), 
indicating that participants reacted more positively to pleasant pictures and more 
negatively to unpleasant pictures, and a significant interaction effect of Slide 
valence and Time (F(1,67)=8.094, p=.006, ηp
2=.108), reflecting a slight raise of 
positive affect with pleasant pictures and a slight raise of negative affect with 
unpleasant pictures for all groups during the experiment. There were no significant 
effects for Group nor interactions with Group. 
Emotional reactivity, affective reaction: specific emotions pre- and post-training. 
To investigate whether the specific emotional reactions of the participants had 
changed after the training, a repeated measures MANOVA was conducted with all 
five different specific emotions separately and with Slide valence (pleasant-un-
pleasant) and Time (before (phase B) and after the training (phase D)) as within 
subject variables and Group as between subjects variable. Analyses revealed no 
significant main Group effects nor significant interactions with Group. 
Affective reactivity, general mood states: pre- and posttest. 
To investigate the effect of the training and the test-procedure on the general-
mood-state of the participants, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for 
depressed mood (DACL), the five specific emotions, general arousal (SAM), and 
general emotional valence (SAM) with Time (before (phase A) and after the test 
(phase F)) as within subject variable and Group as between subjects variable. Means 
and standard deviations for depressed mood (DACL), general arousal (SAM), and 
general emotional valence (SAM) are presented in table 3. Multivariate tests revealed 
Ch
ap
te
r 
 4
O
ve
rg
en
er
al
iz
at
io
n 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 in
te
ns
if
ie
s 
em
ot
io
na
l r
ea
ct
iv
it
y:
 a
 c
og
ni
ti
ve
 b
ia
s 
m
od
if
ic
at
io
n 
ap
pr
oa
ch
81
Ta
bl
e 
3 
  E
m
oti
on
al
 r
ea
cti
vi
ty
, m
oo
d 
da
ta
: d
at
a 
at
 s
ta
rt
 a
nd
 e
nd
 o
f t
he
 e
xp
er
im
en
t 
(A
-F
) o
f g
en
er
al
 a
ro
us
al
 (S
A
M
),
 g
en
er
al
 v
al
en
ce
 
(S
A
M
) a
nd
 d
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
m
oo
d 
(D
A
CL
).
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t
Tr
ai
ni
ng
-c
on
di
ti
on
G
en
er
al
 m
oo
d 
st
at
e 
Pr
et
es
t (
A
)
G
en
er
al
 m
oo
d 
st
at
e 
Po
stt
es
t 
(F
)
M
SD
M
SD
G
en
er
al
 a
ro
us
al
 
O
ve
rg
en
er
al
iz
ati
on
4.
71
1.
65
4.
71
1.
52
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
4.
77
2.
05
4.
86
1.
67
Fr
ee
 a
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
4.
30
1.
61
4.
74
1.
68
G
en
er
al
 v
al
en
ce
 
O
ve
rg
en
er
al
iz
ati
on
6.
54
1.
35
6.
13
1.
45
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
6.
14
1.
55
6.
64
1.
00
Fr
ee
 a
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
6.
56
1.
24
6.
26
1.1
0
D
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
m
oo
d 
(D
AC
L)
O
ve
rg
en
er
al
iz
ati
on
6.
75
4.
01
8.
83
4.
52
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
7.
50
3.
57
7.
50
3.
42
Fr
ee
 a
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
7.
91
4.
14
8.
91
4.
72
N
o
te
. S
A
M
 =
 S
el
f-
A
ss
es
sm
en
t 
M
an
ik
in
; D
A
C
L 
= 
D
ep
re
ss
io
n 
A
dj
ec
ti
ve
 C
he
ck
 L
is
ts
.
82
a significant main effect for Time (F(8,62)=3.954, p=.001, ηp
2=.338) and a significant 
interaction effect for Time and Group (F(16,124)=1.707, p=.050, ηp
2=.181) indicating 
that the mood of the participants changed after the training and that it changed 
differently in the different groups. On the separate univariate tests, however we did 
not find differences between the groups on depressed mood (DACL) or general 
arousal. The specific emotions afraid and sad gave a significant effect, but only for 
Time (resp. F(1,69)=5.119, p=.027, ηp
2=.069 and F(1,69)=3.856, p=.054, ηp
2=.053). 
SAM ratings of general emotional valence gave a significant univariate interaction 
effect for Time and Group (F(2,69)=3.715, p=.029, ηp
2=.097). Contrast analyses on 
general emotional valence revealed that the OG group differed from the SP group 
in the way valence changed from phase A to phase F (p=.013), but not from the FA 
group (p=n.s.). Paired-samples t-tests that were performed for each group 
separately to assess the nature of this change in valence, revealed no significant 
changes in valence. Inspection of the separate means on all measures however, 
reveals a trend that mood had become more negative in the subjects trained to 
overgeneralize and more positive in the subjects trained to specify.
DISCuSSION
The primary aim of the present study was to develop an experimental paradigm to 
investigate an overgeneral processing mode that is situation-focused and associative, 
in contrast to self-focused and focused on interpretative, analytical, evaluative 
processing. To induce overgeneralization, we trained participants to produce as 
many associations as possible that evoke the same feelings as a set of consecutively 
presented pictures, pleasant as well as unpleasant. The training procedure appeared 
to be effective in creating an overgeneral processing mode: results at the end of 
the training-phase indicate that the overgeneralization training- procedure success - 
fully influenced participants to produce more situation- focused associative over-
generalizations than the participants in both control-groups. This effect shows up for 
simple as well as categoric, and for positive as well as for negative overgeneralizations. 
Also, the participants in this experiment hardly produced interpretative over-
generalizations (overgeneralizations related to causes, meanings and consequences 
of an event or action) and no group differences could be established for this category. 
 The training-effect  remained for some time but decreased rapidly. The increase 
of simple overgeneralizations in the experimental group lasted long enough to 
draw a safe conclusion concerning its effect on emotional reactivity. We cannot be 
certain, though, about the effect of the increase of categoric overgeneralizations 
on emotional reactivity during the entire testing phase, as this increase had 
disappeared at the start of phase E. For now, we conclude that the cognitive bias 
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modification paradigm presented here, offers an interesting opportunity for the 
investigation of the overgeneralization concept and its influence on emotional 
reactivity, but that future use of the paradigm may benefit from improvement of 
the training procedures to have longer impact, for example with longer and 
repeated training sessions.
 Given the evidence that a group difference in the number of overgeneraliza-
tions was induced, it was possible to directly examine the hypothesis that overgen-
eralization influences emotional reactivity. Analyses of the arousal scores confirmed, 
that the participants in the overgeneralization training condition displayed a 
significant and substantial elevation of arousal in response to the stimulus pictures. 
The participants trained to focus on the stimulus picture or to focus on whatever 
comes to mind, reported no significant change in arousal. This finding is in line with 
the findings on overgeneralization and affect intensity of Larsen and colleagues 
(Larsen & Diener, 1987; Larsen, Diener & Cropanzano, 1987; Larsen et al., 1996), and 
Dritschel and Teasdale (1996). It is also in line with the findings of Watkins, Moberly, 
and Moulds (2008) on the causal influence of an overgeneral processing mode on 
emotional reactivity. 
 In contrast to the findings of Watkins, Moberly, and Moulds (2008), and 
contrary to our expectations, we did not find a significant effect on our measure of 
depressive mood. Yet, we did find that the mood of the participants had significantly 
changed after the training and that it changed differently in the different groups; 
also, we found non-significant trends that the mood of the participants became 
more negative in the overgeneralization-condition and more positive in the specifi-
cation-condition. This is remarkable since the participants in the overgeneralization 
condition showed more intense affective reactions following both negative and 
positive stimuli. These trends of a negative effect on mood in the overgeneraliza-
tion group and a positive effect on mood in the specification group resemble the 
findings of Watkins, Moberly, and Moulds (2008), Watkins and Moberly (2009) and 
Watkins, Baeyens, and Read (2009) that negative mood increases in individuals that 
are trained in overgeneral thinking and decreases in individuals that are trained to 
focus on concrete, specific details of a stimulus. The fact that we did not find a 
greater effect on depressive mood can possibly be explained by the switching 
between both positive and negative stimuli, the short time effect of the training 
procedure and/or the small sample size. Another possibility is that the induction of 
overgeneralization in individuals who are not dysphoric has no differential effect on 
mood.  Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995), for example, found that induction 
of rumination in dysphoric individuals intensified dysphoric mood but had no effect 
in nondysphoric individuals. An interesting finding in this matter, is that we found 
a main effect of slide valence in the test on training-effect. This finding suggests 
that overgeneralization was more easily induced with unpleasant cues than with 
84
pleasant cues. This might explain the negative trend on mood we found in the over-
generalization-group. 
 The answer to the speculative question whether certain specific emotion types 
would be influenced more than other emotion types by the different training- 
conditions is negative since no significant differences were found between the 
groups. This non-result suggests that overgeneralization – or specification – as 
induced by the training methods in the current study, appears to influence the 
intensity and possibly the valence of emotional reactions but does not affect any 
emotion type specifically.
 In conclusion, our operationalization of overgeneralization as situation-focused 
and associative, in contrast to self-focused and focused on analytical, interpretative, 
evaluative processing, appears to have effectively induced overgeneralization in 
reaction to positive as well as negative emotional cues. Our study extends the work 
of Larsen and colleagues (1987, 1996), Dritschel and Teasdale (1991) and Watkins 
and colleagues (2001, 2008, 2009) as it offers a new paradigm for studying over-
generalization. Furthermore, results show that this overgeneralization induction 
influences emotional reactivity, as it led to more intense reactions to affective 
stimuli in terms of the arousal that is experienced. Besides, it had a possible negative 
effect on mood. These findings are relevant to cognitive theories of depression and 
other psychological disorders, and offer further support for a possible intrinsical 
relation between overgeneralization and affect intensity. The paradigm can be 
used to further investigate positive and negative associative, situation-focused 
overgeneralization and its influence on emotional reactivity which may contribute 
to the development of more effective and/or efficient treatment methods.
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In the past three decades, cognitive models have explicitly emphasized the role of 
cognitive biases or cognitive processing modes in the onset and maintenance of 
depression and other psychological disorders (e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). 
Overgeneralization is a prominent concept in these models. Experimental studies 
have found evidence that overgeneral thinking is a cognitive bias that causally 
 contributes to depressive symptoms (Watkins & Moberly, 2009; Watkins, Baeyens, & 
Read, 2009). The three approaches to overgeneralization described in the general 
introduction provide overlapping but also contradictory hypotheses with respect to 
the occurrence and workings of overgeneralization. The aim of the present disserta-
tion is to evaluate and refine some of these hypotheses. In this chapter we will first 
provide a summary and a discussion of the major findings of the studies reported 
in the present thesis.  Finally we will formulate our major conclusions in the context 
of the most up-to-date therapeutic implementation of the findings concerning 
overgeneralization.
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SuMMAry AND DISCuSSION Of THE fINDINGS
Testing the conceptualization, delimitation and occurrence of the overgeneralization 
concept
The results of the study reported in chapter 2 clearly show that information 
processing in individuals suffering from clinical depression is characterized by an 
increased tendency toward negative overgeneralization. Results also show that it 
is important to distinguish between two ways of defining and measuring over-
generalization as Carver and Ganellen (1983), MacLeod and Williams (1990) and 
Epstein (1992) already suggested. Overgeneralization in individuals with MDD is not 
restricted to misattributions directed at the self, but extends to misattributions 
directed at situations in the outside world. Although the patterns of group differences 
between patients and non-patients are largely the same for the two types of over-
generalization, the heterogeneity of the overgeneralization-concept is displayed in 
the finding that overgeneralization to the self and overgeneralization across situations 
show slightly different patterns in different patient groups. This finding justifies a 
broader focus on overgeneralization than only on overgeneralization to the self. 
 Results further show that variations in the tendency to overgeneralize between 
patients and non-patients are not restricted to negative content, but also extend to 
positive content. The absence, though, rather than the presence of positive over-
generalization, appears to be related to emotional disorders. The data confirm, 
now in a clinical population, the findings by Klar et al. (1997), that patients suffering 
from MDD not only overgeneralize more following negative events than non- 
patients, but they overgeneralize less following positive events as well. These 
findings are in agreement with the cognitive distortion view of depression 
(Beck,1976) in that patients with MDD differ from non-patients not only in the 
negative content of their thoughts, but also in their inferential process: patients 
with MDD show a processing-bias in that they have different overgeneralization 
tendencies than non-patients. Furthermore, these findings are in line with the 
hypothesis of the tripartite model of mood disorders by Clark and Watson (1991) 
that depression can be accounted for not only by the presence of negative overgen-
eralization, but also – or even more – by the absence of positive overgeneralization. 
The answer to the question whether overgeneralization is unique to depression is 
clearly negative. The tendency to overgeneralize is also present in non-patients. 
They tend to overgeneralize to a degree which is comparable to individuals suffering 
from depression. However, they overgeneralize more following positive events, 
while depressed patients overgeneralize more following negative events. Results 
also show that non-patients show more positive than negative overgeneralization, 
indicative of a positivity bias. This finding is in agreement with findings by Epstein 
(1992) and Klar et al. (1997). Epstein (1992) suggested that this positivity bias in 
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non-patients serves as a tendency toward unrealistic but healthy self-enhance-
ment. In our study, this effect was found in attributions to the self as well as across 
situations, suggesting that this positivity bias in healthy individuals not only 
enhances their self-confidence, but also protects their view of the world against the 
effect of negative overgeneralization.
 The answer to the question whether high levels of negative overgeneralization 
are unique for depression remains inconclusive. Patients with MDD, BPD and 
BPD+MDD all show more negative than positive overgeneralization to the self. So, 
all patients show a negativity bias on overgeneralization to the self, and not a 
positivity bias as non-patients do. These findings suggest that, as compared to nev-
er-depressed individuals, patients with BPD and patients with MDD both lack a 
buffer against negative cognitions directed at the self (e.g. Lightsey, 1994). However, 
we were unable to rule out the possibility that these tendencies could be part of a 
more general diathesis for depression also shared by the patients suffering from 
BPD without a comorbid MDD at the time of testing. On the other hand, these 
patient groups do show different biases on overgeneralization across situations. 
While the patients with MDD resemble the non-patients’ positivity bias in showing 
more positive than negative overgeneralization across situations, patients with BPD 
– with or without a comorbid MDD – show neither a positivity, nor a negativity bias. 
The difference between these patient groups appears to be that while patients with 
MDD seem to be able to hold on to expectations of positive situations to come 
again, patients with BPD appear to lack this specific positivity bias. Therefore, for 
now, a conclusion that a bias characterized by an increased tendency toward 
negative overgeneralizations to the self and a decreased tendency toward positive 
overgeneralizations to the self is typical for individuals who are depression prone, 
seems to be in place. For overgeneralization across situations, the conclusion for 
now is somewhat different as for this type of overgeneralization, patients with 
MDD do not show a negativity bias but resemble the non-patients’ positivity bias. 
However, patients with BPD – with or without a comorbid MDD – show neither a 
positivity nor a negativity bias, which appears to  contribute to their cognitive 
vulnerability to psychological distress. 
Investigation of how individual differences in the tendency to overgeneralize lead to 
differences in the level of psychological distress
Evidence from different lines of research suggest that both the level of a person’s 
self-esteem and one’s affect intensity play a crucial role in the relation between 
overgeneralization and psychological distress. Chapter 3 focuses on the nature of 
the relation between overgeneralization and psychological distress, taking into 
account the relations with low self-esteem and  high affect intensity. Previous 
studies have provided contradictory evidence on the nature of this relation. Several 
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studies suggest that overgeneralization is the mediator, where others suggest that 
overgeneralization is the predictor. The results presented in chapter 3 are in support 
of the model  that indicates that overgeneralization is not the mediator but the 
predictor and that the effect of overgeneralization on psychological distress is not 
only mediated by low self-esteem but also by negative affect intensity. The findings 
are consistent with Epstein’s (1992) theoretical considerations about the conceptu-
alization of overgeneralization and self-esteem. According to Epstein, it may not be 
difficult to explain why children under certain circumstances develop negative 
self-views. What is more puzzling, is why they maintain their negative self-views in 
adulthood, under conditions in which their self-view is clearly incorrect. Epstein 
suggests that people do so, because they overgeneralize in a negatively biased way. 
In this conceptualization, overgeneralization does not result from, but leads to low 
levels of self-esteem, resulting in greater psychological distress. The findings 
reported in chapter 3 demonstrate exactly this. In addition, our results extend 
Epstein’s theoretical considerations on overgeneralization to both self-esteem and 
affect intensity. That is, they suggest that the trait of high negative affect intensity 
does not lead to, but results from negatively biased overgeneralization.
How to manipulate overgeneralization? A pilot proof-of-principle study
The primary aim of the study described in chapter 4, was to develop an experimental 
paradigm to investigate an overgeneral processing mode that is situation-focused 
and associative, in contrast to self-focused and focused on interpretative, analytical, 
evaluative processing. To induce overgeneralization, we trained participants to 
produce as many associations as possible that evoke the same feelings as a set of 
consecutively presented pictures, pleasant as well as unpleasant. The training 
procedure appeared to be effective in creating an overgeneral processing mode: 
results at the end of the training-phase indicate that the overgeneralization train-
ing-procedure successfully influenced participants to produce more situation-fo-
cused associative overgeneralizations than the participants in both control-groups. 
This effect shows up for simple as well as categoric, and for positive as well as for 
negative overgeneralizations. Also, the participants in this experiment hardly 
produced interpretative overgeneralizations (overgeneralizations related to causes, 
meanings and consequences of an event or action) and no group differences could 
be established for this category. The training-effect  remained for some time but 
decreased rapidly.
 Given the evidence that a group difference in the number of overgeneraliza-
tions was induced, it was possible to directly examine the hypothesis that overgen-
eralization influences emotional reactivity. Analyses of the arousal scores confirmed, 
that the participants in the overgeneralization training condition displayed a 
significant and substantial elevation of arousal in response to the stimulus pictures. 
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The participants trained to focus on the stimulus picture or to focus on whatever 
comes to mind, reported no significant change in arousal. This finding is in line with 
the findings on overgeneralization and affect intensity of Larsen and colleagues 
(Larsen & Diener, 1987; Larsen, Diener & Cropanzano, 1987; Larsen et al., 1996), and 
Dritschel and Teasdale (1996). It is also in line with the findings of Watkins, Moberly, 
and Moulds (2008) on the causal influence of an overgeneral processing mode on 
emotional reactivity. 
 In contrast to the findings of Watkins, Moberly, and Moulds (2008), and 
contrary to our expectations, we did not find a significant effect on our measure of 
depressive mood. Yet, we did find that the mood of the participants had significantly 
changed after the training and that it changed differently in the different groups; 
also, we found non-significant trends that the mood of the participants became 
more negative in the overgeneralization-condition and more positive in the specifi-
cation-condition. These trends of a negative effect on mood in the overgeneraliza-
tion group and a positive effect on mood in the specification group resemble the 
findings of Watkins, Moberly, and Moulds (2008), Watkins and Moberly (2009) and 
Watkins, Baeyens, and Read (2009) that negative mood increases in individuals that 
are trained in overgeneral thinking and decreases in individuals that are trained to 
focus on concrete, specific details of a stimulus. 
 The operationalization of overgeneralization as situation-focused and associative, 
in contrast to self-focused and focused on analytical, interpretative, evaluative 
processing, appears to have effectively induced overgeneralization in reaction to 
positive as well as negative emotional cues. The training-effect  remained for some 
time but decreased rapidly. For now, we conclude that the cognitive bias modification 
paradigm presented in chapter 4, offers an interesting opportunity for the investigation 
of the overgeneralization concept and its influence on emotional reactivity. Future 
use of the paradigm may benefit from improvement of the training procedures to 
have longer impact, for example with longer and repeated training sessions. The 
study extends the work of Larsen and colleagues (1987, 1996), Dritschel and Teasdale 
(1991) and Watkins and colleagues (2001, 2008, 2009) as it offers a new paradigm 
for studying overgeneralization. Furthermore, results show that this overgeneral-
ization induction influences emotional reactivity, as it led to more intense reactions 
to affective stimuli in terms of the arousal that is experienced. Besides, it had a 
possible negative effect on mood. These findings are relevant to cognitive theories of 
depression and other psychological disorders, and offer further support for a possible 
intrinsical relation between overgeneralization and affect intensity. The paradigm 
can be used to further investigate positive and negative associative, situation- 
focused overgeneralization and its influence on emotional reactivity which may 
contribute to the development of more effective and/or efficient treatment 
methods.
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THEOrETICAl AND PrACTICAl IMPlICATIONS
The findings described in chapters 2 and 4 suggest that the focus of most authors in 
the literature on self-focused negative overgeneralization is just, as this type of 
overgeneralization seems to have the most prominent effect on depressive 
symptoms. The findings from these two chapters also suggest that an exclusive 
focus on self-focused negative overgeneralization leaves out relevant aspects of 
the overgeneralization concept. Situation-focused overgeneralization seems to add 
a dimension to the overgeneralization concept that is especially relevant in the 
cognitive processing of individuals suffering from borderline personality disorder. 
In addition, the finding that overgeneralization across situations basically goes 
together with overgeneralization to the self, but to a different degree in different 
populations supports the conviction that we are dealing with a thinking style or 
processing mode here, not a content-driven belief. 
 The finding that clinical patients show different proportions of negative as well as 
positive overgeneralization than non-patients and that different patient populations 
show different intensities of the different overgeneralization types, suggests that 
we are not dealing with one cognitive bias but with a combination of three: (1) a bias 
towards overgeneral vs. specific processing; (2) a positivity vs. a negativity bias, and 
(3) a bias towards overgeneral processing of information concerning the self vs. 
information concerning situations in the outside world. Research findings from 
earlier studies already suggested that the combination of high overgeneral, negative 
self-focused processing is what underlies depressive vulnerability. The studies 
described in this dissertation extend these findings with evidence that the 
combination of high overgeneral, positive self-focused processing may act as a 
buffer against depressive symptoms. The tendency towards negative, overgeneral 
processing in individuals suffering from depression also extends to situation-fo-
cused processing but this tendency does not seem to be problematic since it is 
compensated by a stronger tendency towards positive situation-focused overgen-
eralization. Individuals suffering from borderline personality disorder do not show 
such a stronger tendency towards positive situation-focused overgeneralization 
which might explain why borderline patients typically also show negative schemata 
of the world surrounding them (e.g. Young, 1999; Lawrence, Allen & Chanen, 2011). 
From a theoretical perspective, an exclusive focus on negative, self-focused over-
generalization turns away attention from the fact that we are dealing with a thinking 
style or processing mode which is in essence not related to positive or negative 
content per se, or focused on self or on situations per se. 
 Although models of cognitive biases associated with anxiety, depression or 
other psychological disorders differ in numerous ways, they share the assumption 
that cognitive processes play a causal role in emotional vulnerability. This assumption is 
96
not only crucial to these theories, but it also carries implications for the therapeutic 
value of the interventions based on these theories. The finding presented in chapter 
3 that overgeneralization predicts the effect of low self-esteem and negative affect 
intensity on psychological distress may have some theoretical implications. 
Although causal relations may not be concluded from the data, they do suggest that 
overgeneralization influences level of self-esteem and the intensity of affect and 
not the other way around. This suggestion is in agreement with the findings 
reported in chapter 4 as they show that an associative, situation-focused over - 
general processing mode influences affect intensity, and possibly has an effect on 
the valence of the participants’ mood. These findings extend the findings by 
Watkins and his coworkers who found that an interpretative, self-focused over- 
general processing mode influences emotional reactivity. 
 The findings in chapter 3 suggest that negative overgeneralization has an effect 
on psychological distress but only via the mediating variables of low self-esteem 
and high affect intensity. These findings also suggest that manipulation of an 
overgeneral processing mode will affect both the level of self-esteem and the 
intensity of affect at the same time. This finding advocates the manipulation of 
overgeneralization in treatments of all psychological disorders in which self-esteem 
and intensity of affect play a role. 
 Watkins and his collaborators have recently developed an innovative cognitive 
bias modification training as a treatment intervention for depression: concreteness 
training (Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009). Concreteness training is designed to 
train dysphoric individuals to become more concrete and specific in their thinking 
i.e. focus on specific details of an event, on what makes each event unique and on 
the process how it happened, as a way to decrease overgeneral thinking. This 
training proved to be successful in that it led to greater increases in concrete 
thinking than controls and to greater decreases in depressive symptoms. The 
findings presented in this dissertation suggest that concreteness training would 
benefit from a supplement in which individuals are trained to be more concrete 
with negative events not only when focused on the self but also in not self-focused 
negative events. This advice is especially apt when this treatment method would be 
applied for the treatment of individuals with symptoms of borderline personality 
disorder. This treatment supplement comes close to the training of borderline 
personality patients to take a mindful, non-judgmental stance to all experiences, 
self-relevant or not, as proposed in Linehan’s dialectical behavior therapy (1993), 
but offers a different, more cognition-focused, training method. Furthermore, the 
findings presented in this dissertation suggest a supplement to concreteness-train-
ing in which patients are explicitly trained to be more overgeneral in self-focused 
positive events. For the treatment of individuals with symptoms of borderline 
personality disorder, a supplement should also be made for the training of positive 
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situation-focused overgeneral processing. Most traditional treatment methods 
have focused exclusively on the decrease of negativity and left the increase of 
positivity to cognitive manipulation methods which were supposed to be less 
evidence based. This dissertation supports cognitive manipulation of a positive 
overgeneral processing mode. In conclusion, the findings presented in this dissertation 
suggest that there may be value in further developing and evaluating bias 
modification training methods to induce different combinations of overgeneral vs. 
specific, positivity biased vs. negativity biased, self-focused vs. situation focused, 
and associative vs. interpretative processing modes. These bias modification methods 
can be applied as potential interventions to support treatments for depression, and 
borderline personality disorder.
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NEDErlANDSE SAMENVATTING
In de laatste drie decennia is in cognitieve modellen over het ontstaan en het 
behoud van depressieve en andere psychologische stoornissen, door verschillende 
auteurs gewezen op de cruciale rol van cognitieve biases of cognitieve informatie-
verwerkingsstijlen (bijv., Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Met name de cognitieve bias 
overgeneralisatie komt in deze modellen naar voren als een centraal concept. 
Diverse experimentele studies hebben aangetoond dat een overgegeneraliserende 
manier van denken leidt tot depressieve symptomen (Watkins & Moberly, 2009; 
Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009). In de inleiding van dit proefschrift zijn drie over- 
lappende maar ook elkaar tegensprekende hypotheses beschreven met betrekking 
tot het voorkomen en de werking van overgeneralisatie. De eerste benadering 
focust in het bijzonder op het verband tussen overgeneralisatie en een laag gevoel 
van eigenwaarde. De tweede benadering gaat in op het verband tussen over-
generalisatie en een hoog niveau van affect intensiteit. De derde benadering gaat 
in op hoe overgeneralisatie van invloed is op het informatieverwerkingsproces. 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om een aantal hypotheses afgeleid van deze drie 
benaderingen te evalueren en verder aan te scherpen. In dit hoofdstuk geef ik 
eerst een samenvatting en een bespreking van de belangrijkste bevindingen uit 
de studies die in dit proefschrift worden beschreven. Vervolgens worden de 
belangrijkste conclusies voor het theoretisch concept en consequenties voor de 
klinische praktijk beschreven.
Onderzoek naar de conceptualisatie, de afgrenzing en het voorkomen 
van overgeneralisatie
Het onderzoek naar overgeneralisatie tot nu toe wordt gekenmerkt door een vrijwel 
exclusief focus op negatieve overgeneralisatie gericht op het zelf. De resultaten van 
de studie, beschreven in hoofdstuk 2, tonen inderdaad aan dat de informatie-
verwerking van mensen die lijden aan een klinische depressie wordt gekenmerkt 
door een toegenomen neiging tot negatief overgeneraliseren. De bevindingen laten 
echter bovendien zien dat het belangrijk is om onderscheid te maken tussen 
twee manieren van definiëren en meten van overgeneralisatie. Overgeneralisatie 
blijkt bij mensen die lijden aan een depressieve stoornis zich niet te beperken 
tot verkeerde attributies over zichzelf maar zich tevens te manifesteren in 
misattributies over situaties in de buitenwereld. De patronen van groepsverschillen 
tussen patiënten en niet-patiënten blijken min of meer hetzelfde voor de twee 
typen overgeneralisatie (overgeneralisatie naar het zelf en overgeneralisatie over 
situaties). Tussen verschillende patiëntengroepen vinden we echter verschillende 
patronen wat suggereert dat het overgeneralisatieconcept heterogeen van aard is. 
Deze bevindingen dringen aan op het hanteren van een bredere focus op over-
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generalisatie dan het nauwe focus op overgeneralisatie naar het zelf dat in de 
meeste onderzoeken gehanteerd wordt. 
 Resultaten uit het onderzoek beschreven in hoofdstuk 2 tonen voorts aan dat 
patiënten en niet-patiënten niet alleen verschillen in de mate waarin zij negatief 
overgeneraliseren maar ook in de mate waarin zij positief overgeneraliseren. Ten 
aanzien van positieve overgeneralisatie blijkt echter dat het hebben van een 
emotionele stoornis niet samengaat met een overmaat maar met een tekort aan 
overgeneralisatie. Deze studie repliceert in een klinische populatie de bevindingen 
van Klar et al. (1997) dat patiënten die lijden aan een depressieve stoornis niet 
alleen meer overgeneraliseren naar aanleiding van negatieve gebeurtenissen dan 
niet-patiënten, maar ook minder overgeneraliseren naar aanleiding van positieve 
gebeurtenissen. Deze bevindingen komen overeen met de visie van Beck (1976) dat 
patiënten die lijden aan een depressieve stoornis verschillen van niet-patiënten 
niet alleen in de negatieve inhoud van hun gedachten maar ook in de vorm van hun 
denkprocessen. Het denken van mensen met een depressieve stoornis is immers 
verstoord in dat de overgeneralisaties in hun denken zich anders manifesteren dan 
bij niet-patiënten. Deze bevindingen sluiten ook aan bij de hypothese van het 
driedelig model van stemmingsstoornissen van Clark en Watson (1991). Dit model 
beschrijft dat depressie niet alleen wordt bepaald door de aanwezigheid van 
negatieve denkprocessen (zoals negatieve overgeneralisatie) maar ook – of zelfs 
nog meer – door de afwezigheid van positieve denkprocessen (zoals positieve over-
generalisatie).
 Overgeneralisatie is met name onderzocht in de context van haar effect op 
depressie. Uit de gepresenteerde onderzoeksresultaten blijkt echter dat het 
antwoord op de vraag of overgeneralisatie kenmerkend is voor depressie is, 
duidelijk negatief is. De neiging tot overgeneraliseren komt immers ook voor bij 
niet-patiënten. Niet-patiënten overgeneraliseren in een mate die vergelijkbaar is 
met patiënten die lijden aan een depressieve stoornis. Niet-patiënten overgenera-
liseren echter duidelijk meer na positieve gebeurtenissen, terwijl depressieve 
patiënten meer overgeneraliseren na negatieve gebeurtenissen. Niet-patiënten 
vertonen bovendien een positieve bias: ze overgeneraliseren meer positief dan 
negatief. Deze bevinding sluit aan bij die van Epstein (1992) en Klar et al. (1997). 
Epstein (1992) suggereert dat deze positieve bias bij niet-patiënten dient als een 
niet-realistische maar wel gezonde neiging tot zelf-versterking of zelf-behoud. In 
onze studie vonden we dit effect zowel voor attributies naar het zelf als over 
situaties wat suggereert dat deze positieve bias gezonde individuen niet alleen 
helpt hun zelfvertrouwen te behouden en versterken maar ook hun visie op de 
buitenwereld beschermt tegen het effect van negatieve overgeneralisatie.
 De vraag of een sterke neiging tot negatieve overgeneralisatie uniek is voor 
depressie blijft onbeantwoord. Patiënten met een depressieve stoornis, een 
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borderline persoonlijkheidsstoornis en een borderline persoonlijkheidsstoornis 
met een comorbide depressieve stoornis vertonen allen meer negatieve dan 
positieve overgeneralisatie naar het zelf. Al deze patiënten vertonen dus een 
negatieve bias wat betreft overgeneralisatie naar het zelf, niet een positieve bias 
zoals niet-patiënten. De bevindingen in deze studie veronderstellen dat zowel 
borderline patiënten als depressieve patiënten, in tegenstelling tot mensen die 
nooit depressief geweest zijn, een buffer missen tegen negatieve cognities gericht 
op het zelf (bijv. Lightsey, 1994). We hebben hierbij echter niet de mogelijkheid 
kunnen uitsluiten dat deze denkfouten onderdeel zouden kunnen zijn van een meer 
algemene kwetsbaarheid voor depressie die ook voor zou komen bij borderline 
patiënten die niet depressief waren op het moment van testen. Deze patiënten-
groepen waren wel van elkaar te onderscheiden in dat zij verschillende biases 
vertonen met betrekking tot overgeneralisatie over situaties. Waar patiënten met 
een depressie, net zoals niet-patiënten, meer positief dan negatief overgeneraliseren 
over situaties en dus een positieve bias vertonen, vertonen patiënten met een 
borderline persoonlijkheidsstoornis hier noch een positieve, noch een negatieve 
bias. Het verschil tussen deze patiëntengroepen lijkt hier te zijn dat patiënten met 
een depressieve stoornis in staat lijken te zijn om een positieve verwachting te 
handhaven ten aanzien van de terugkeer van positieve situaties, maar dat borderline 
patiënten deze positieve bias missen. Voor dit moment lijkt de conclusie dan ook op 
zijn plaats dat een verhoogde neiging tot negatief overgeneraliseren naar het zelf 
en een verlaagde neiging tot positief overgeneraliseren naar het zelf kenmerkend is 
voor mensen met een kwetsbaarheid voor depressie. Echter voor overgeneralisatie 
over situaties luidt de voorlopige conclusie anders. Voor dit type overgeneralisatie 
lijkt te gelden dat depressieve patiënten, net zoals niet-patiënten, een positieve 
bias vertonen. Patiënten met een borderline persoonlijkheidsstoornis met of zonder 
een comorbide depressie vertonen noch een positieve noch een negatieve bias 
hetgeen lijkt bij te dragen aan hun cognitieve kwetsbaarheid voor psychologische 
stress.
Verkenning van het effect van individuele verschillen in de neiging tot 
overgeneralisatie op verschillen in het niveau van psychologische stress
Onderzoeksresultaten uit verschillende onderzoekslijnen suggereren dat zowel de 
hoogte van het gevoel van eigenwaarde als de intensiteit van het gevoelde affect 
een cruciale rol spelen in de relatie tussen overgeneralisatie en de mate van 
iemands psychologisch lijden. Hoofdstuk 3 richt zich op de aard van de relatie 
tussen overgeneralisatie en psychologisch lijden en de rol van een laag niveau van 
eigenwaarde en een hoge affect intensiteit in deze relatie. Eerdere studies hebben 
tegenstrijdige gegevens opgeleverd ten aanzien van de aard van deze relatie. 
Sommige studies suggereren dat overgeneralisatie in deze relatie de rol heeft van 
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mediator waar andere studies suggereren dat overgeneralisatie juist de voorspeller 
is van de andere variabelen. In deze studies werden de vier variabelen echter nooit 
in één model tegelijkertijd onderzocht. De resultaten die gepresenteerd worden in 
hoofdstuk 3 ondersteunen het model dat veronderstelt dat overgeneralisatie niet 
de mediator is maar de voorspeller en dat het effect van overgeneralisatie op 
psychologisch lijden wordt gemedieerd door zowel een laag niveau van eigenwaarde 
als een hoge negatieve affect intensiteit. Deze bevindingen ondersteunen de 
beschrijving van Linehan (1993b) van de emotionele geest maar lijken in tegenspraak 
met haar gedachten (Linehan, 1993a) over hoe de transactie tussen hoge affect 
intensiteit en zelf-invalidatie kan leiden tot emotieregulatie strategieën zoals over-
generalisatie die resulteren in psychologisch lijden. De bevindingen lijken het best 
te corresponderen met de theoretische bespiegelingen van Epstein (1992) over 
overgeneralisatie en gevoelens van eigenwaarde. Volgens Epstein is het niet zo 
moeilijk om te verklaren waarom kinderen onder bepaalde omstandigheden een 
negatief zelfbeeld ontwikkelen. Wat echter meer vragen oproept is waarom zij dit 
negatieve zelfbeeld behouden als zij volwassen zijn, in omstandigheden waarin hun 
zelfbeeld duidelijk onjuist is. Epstein veronderstelt dat een negatief zelfbeeld in 
stand gehouden wordt door de overgeneralisatie van negatieve gebeurtenissen. In 
zijn conceptualisatie is overgeneralisatie dus niet het gevolg van een laag gevoel 
van eigenwaarde maar leidt het juist tot een negatief zelfbeeld wat weer resulteert 
in psychologisch lijden. Onze onderzoeksresultaten sluiten volledig aan bij deze 
visie. Ze voegen er bovendien aan toe dat Epsteins overwegingen ten aanzien van 
overgeneralisatie en negatief zelfbeeld ook opgaan voor overgeneralisatie en een 
hoge intensiteit van negatieve gevoelens. De data suggereren dat een gemiddeld 
hoge intensiteit van negatieve gevoelens het gevolg is van negatieve overgenerali-
satie, niet de oorzaak.
Hoe kunnen we overgeneralisatie manipuleren? Een pilot “proof-of- 
principle” studie
Het eerste doel van de studie die wordt beschreven in hoofdstuk 4, was om een 
experimenteel paradigma te ontwikkelen om onderzoek te kunnen doen naar een 
overgeneraliserende denkstijl die gericht is op situaties en associatief is. Dit in 
contrast met eerdere onderzoeken naar een overgeneraliserende denkstijl die 
gericht is op het zelf en op informatieverwerking die meer analyserend en 
evaluerend van aard is, zoals bij mensen die veel piekeren. Om overgeneralisatie op 
te wekken, werden proefpersonen getraind om zoveel mogelijk associaties te 
noemen die hetzelfde gevoel oproepen als een set van emotionele stimuli in de 
vorm van foto’s die aangename of onaangename gevoelens oproepen. Deze induc-
tiemethode bleek effectief in dat het leidde tot een sterker overgeneraliserende 
informatieverwerkingsstijl: metingen op het einde van de trainingsfase geven aan 
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dat proefpersonen na de overgeneralisatie training meer associatieve op situaties 
gerichte overgeneralisaties benoemen dan de proefpersonen in de twee vergelij-
kingscondities. Dit verschil zien we voor verschillende types overgeneralisatie en 
zowel bij positieve als bij negatieve overgeneralisaties. En we vinden dat dit type 
overgeneralisatie-inductie zich inderdaad onderscheidt van de eerder onderzochte 
methode omdat het nauwelijks leidt tot overgeneralisaties die te maken hebben 
met een analyserende, evaluerende denkstijl. Het effect van de training hield enige 
tijd aan maar verdween ook weer snel.
 Nadat we hadden vastgesteld dat de verschillende groepen van elkaar 
verschilden in het aantal overgeneralisaties dat zij produceerden, werd het mogelijk 
om gericht onderzoek te doen naar de hypothese dat overgeneralisatie van invloed 
is op emotionele reactiviteit. Analyses van de arousal scores bevestigden dat de 
deelnemers aan de overgeneralisatietraining een significante en substantiële 
verhoging lieten zien van de intensiteit van hun emotionele reactie op de stimuli. 
Zowel de deelnemers aan de controleconditie waarin mensen zich juist op de 
stimuli zelf moesten richten, als de deelnemers aan de controleconditie die vrij 
moesten associëren, vertoonden geen verandering van de intensiteit van hun 
emotionele reactie. Deze onderzoeksbevindingen sluiten aan bij de bevindingen 
ten aanzien van de overgeneralisatie en affect intensiteit van Larsen en zijn collega’s 
(Larsen & Diener, 1987; Larsen, Diener & Cropanzano, 1987; Larsen et al., 1996) en 
van Dritschel en Teasdale (1996). De bevindingen liggen ook in dezelfde lijn als de 
resultaten van de onderzoeken van Watkins, Moberly en Moulds (2008) naar de 
causale relatie tussen een evaluerende, analyserende overgeneraliserende denkstijl 
en emotionele reactiviteit.
 In tegenstelling tot de bevindingen van Watkins, Moberly en Moulds (2008) en 
in tegenspraak met onze eigen verwachtingen vonden we geen direct effect van dit 
type overgeneralisatie op depressieve stemming. De resultaten laten wel zien dat 
de stemming van de deelnemers significant veranderd was na de training en dat 
deze verandering verschilde tussen de verschillende groepen. We vonden 
bovendien niet-significante trends dat de stemming van de deelnemers negatiever 
in de overgeneralisatiegroep en positiever in de groep die zich specifiek op de 
stimuli richtte. Deze trends komen overeen met de bevindingen van Watkins, 
Moberly en Moulds (2008), Watkins en Moberly (2009) en Watkins, Baeyens en 
Read (2009) dat negatieve stemming toeneemt in personen die getraind zijn in een 
overgeneraliserende denkstijl en afneemt in personen die getraind zijn om te 
focussen op de concrete, specifieke details van een stimulus.
 De hier toegepaste operationalisatie van overgeneralisatie als gericht op 
situaties en associatief, in plaats van gericht op het zelf en analyserend, evaluerend 
en interpreterend, lijkt een effectieve inductie van overgeneralisatie te hebben 
opgeleverd in reactie op zowel positieve als negatieve stimuli. Dit trainingseffect 
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nam echter ook snel weer af. Voorlopig, concluderen we dat het ‘cognitive bias 
modification’ (CBM) paradigma zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 4, een interessante 
mogelijkheid biedt om overgeneralisatie en haar effect op emotionele reactiviteit 
verder te onderzoeken binnen het eerder benoemde bredere focus. Het paradigma 
kan verder verbeterd worden door de trainingsprocedures zo aan te passen dat ze 
langer effect hebben, bijvoorbeeld door met langere trainingssessies en meer 
herhaalsessies te werken. Deze studie bouwt zo voort op het werk van Larsen en 
zijn collega’s (1987, 1996), Dritschel en Teasdale (1991) en Watkins en zijn collega’s 
(2001, 2008, 2009) met een nieuw paradigma voor nader onderzoek naar overge-
neralisatie. Overgeneralisatie inductie blijkt van invloed op de emotionele 
reactiviteit; het leidt tot meer intense affectieve reacties en heeft mogelijk een 
negatief effect op de ervaren stemming. Deze bevindingen zijn relevant voor 
cognitieve modellen van depressie en andere psychologische stoornissen, en 
bieden extra onderbouwing voor de hypothese van een mogelijk intrinsieke relatie 
tussen overgeneralisatie en affect intensiteit. Het paradigma kan worden gebruikt 
voor verder onderzoek naar positieve en negatieve associatieve, op situaties 
gerichte overgeneralisatie en haar effect op emotionele reactiviteit. Dit onderzoek 
kan bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling van meer effectieve en/of efficiënte behandel-
methodes.
THEOrETISCHE EN PrAkTISCHE IMPlICATIES
De bevindingen die in de hoofdstukken 2 en 4 beschreven worden, suggereren dat 
het merendeel van de auteurs in de literatuur over overgeneralisatie zich terecht 
richten op negatieve overgeneralisatie gericht op het zelf. Dit type overgeneralisatie 
lijkt het meest aanzienlijke effect te hebben op depressieve symptomen. De 
bevindingen uit deze twee hoofdstukken maken echter ook duidelijk dat een exclusieve? 
focus op negatieve overgeneralisatie gericht op het zelf, relevante aspecten van het 
overgeneralisatieconcept buiten beschouwing laat. Overgeneralisatie gericht op 
situaties lijkt een dimensie toe te voegen aan het overgeneralisatieconcept dat in 
het bijzonder relevant is voor ons begrip van de cognitieve verwerkingsprocessen 
van personen die lijden aan een borderline persoonlijkheidsstoornis. In het bijzonder 
van belang voor de conceptualisatie van overgeneralisatie is de bevinding dat beide 
soorten overgeneralisatie in het algemeen samen opgaan wat betreft de verhouding 
van positieve en negatieve overgeneralisatie maar hierin juist verschillen over 
verschillende patiëntenpopulaties heen. Dit onderbouwt de overtuiging dat het 
hier gaat om een denkstijl of informatieverwerkingsmodus die van invloed is op de 
psychologische coping en niet louter om een inhoud-gestuurde overtuiging of een 
schema.
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De bevinding dat klinische patiënten verschillen van niet-patiënten in de mate 
waarin zij zowel negatief als positief overgeneraliseren en dat verschillende patiënten-
populaties onderling verschillen in de mate waarin zij de verschillende types over-
generalisatie vertonen, veronderstelt dat we niet te maken hebben met één 
cognitieve bias maar met een combinatie van drie: (1) een neiging tot overgenerali-
seren versus een neiging tot specificeren; (2) een positiviteits- versus een negativi-
teitsbias, en (3) een bias in verwerking van informatie over het zelf versus informatie 
over situaties of de wereld om ons heen. Resultaten uit eerdere studies gaven al 
aan dat de combinatie van een overgeneraliserende, negatieve en op het zelf 
gerichte denkstijl bijdraagt aan een kwetsbaarheid voor depressie. De studies die 
worden beschreven in dit proefschrift bevestigen deze hypothese en voegen eraan 
toe dat de combinatie van een overgeneraliserende, positieve en op het zelf 
gerichte denkstijl kan bijdragen aan een beschermende buffer tegen depressieve 
symptomen. Verder wordt bewijs geleverd voor de stelling dat de neiging tot over-
generaliseren van negatieve informatie in personen die lijden aan een depressie, 
zich tevens uitstrekt tot informatie over situaties in de buitenwereld maar dat deze 
negatieve denkstijl hier niet zo problematisch lijkt te zijn omdat zij wordt 
gecompenseerd door een nog sterker aanwezige neiging tot overgeneralisatie van 
positieve situaties. Personen die lijden aan een borderline persoonlijkheidsstoor-
nis, echter, vertonen die neiging tot overgeneralisatie van positieve situaties niet in 
sterkere mate dan de neiging tot negatieve overgeneralisatie van situaties wat zou 
kunnen verklaren waarom het denken van  borderline patiënten bij uitstek wordt 
gekenmerkt door negatieve schemata over de wereld (bijv. Young, 1999; Lawrence, 
Allen & Chanen, 2011). Vanuit een theoretisch perspectief kan opgemerkt worden 
dat een exclusieve focus op negatieve overgeneralisatie gericht op het zelf, zoals 
gehanteerd werd in eerdere studies, de aandacht wegleidt van het feit dat we te 
maken hebben met een denkstijl of informatieverwerkingsmodus die in essentie 
niet samenhangt met of iets positief of negatief is, noch of deze gericht op het zelf 
of op situaties buiten onszelf maar juist kan variëren op al deze facetten.
 De diverse modellen over cognitieve bias samenhangend met angst, depressie 
en andere psychische stoornissen kunnen behoorlijk van elkaar verschillen. Al deze 
modellen komen echter overeen in dat zij veronderstellen dat deze cognitieve 
processen een causale rol spelen in de ontwikkeling van of het behoud van 
emotionele kwetsbaarheid. De bevinding, beschreven in hoofdstuk 3, dat overge-
neralisatie het effect voorspelt van een laag gevoel van eigenwaarde en negatieve 
affectintensiteit op psychologisch lijden, sluit aan bij deze theoretische veronder-
stelling. Ofschoon uit de data geen directe conclusies kunnen worden getrokken 
ten aanzien van de causale relatie tussen deze variabelen, leveren ze wel een sterke 
aanwijzing op dat negatieve overgeneralisatie leidt tot een negatief zelfbeeld en 
hogere affect intensiteit en niet andersom. Deze indicatie wijst in dezelfde richting 
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als de bevindingen die worden beschreven in hoofdstuk 4, die aangeven dat een 
associatieve op situaties gerichte overgeneraliserende informatieverwerkings-
modus invloed heeft op de intensiteit van gevoelens en mogelijk een effect heeft op 
de negatieve dan wel positieve kleur van iemands stemming. De bevindingen sluiten 
tevens aan bij die van Watkins en zijn medewerkers die vonden dat een analyserende 
op het zelf gerichte overgeneraliserende informatieverwerkinsgmodus van invloed 
is op de intensiteit en valentie van de stemming. De assumptie van een causale 
rol voor overgeneralisatie is niet alleen cruciaal voor theorieën over depressie, 
angst en andere psychologische stoornissen maar heeft ook implicaties voor de 
therapeutische waarde van de interventies die erop zijn gebaseerd.
 De bevindingen uit hoofdstuk 3 leveren bewijs dat negatieve overgeneralisatie 
een effect heeft op psychologisch lijden maar alleen via de mediërende variabelen 
laag zelfbeeld en hoge affect intensiteit. Dit resultaat suggereert ook dat manipulatie 
van een overgeneraliserende verwerkingsmodus tegelijkertijd invloed zal hebben 
op zowel het zelfbeeld als op de intensiteit van gevoelens. Deze conclusie vormt 
een sterk argument om overgeneralisatie te bewerken in de behandeling van alle 
psychologische stoornissen waarin het zelfbeeld en de intensiteit van gevoelens 
een rol spelen.
 Watkins en zijn medewerkers hebben recentelijk een innovatieve cognitieve 
bias modificatie training ontwikkeld als een behandelinterventie voor depressie, de 
zogenaamde concreteness training (Watkins, Baeyens & Read, 2009). Concreteness 
training is ontworpen om personen die lijden aan dysforie te trainen om meer 
specifiek en concreet te denken, i.e. te focussen op specifieke details van een 
gebeurtenis, op wat een gebeurtenis uniek maakt en op hoe iets gebeurd is, als een 
manier om overgeneraliserend denken te doen afnemen. Deze training blijkt 
succesvol. Hij leidt tot een toename van concreet specifiek denken en een afname 
van depressieve symptomen. De resultaten van de studies in dit proefschrift geven 
aan dat het effect van concreteness training verder versterkt zou kunnen worden 
als deze zodanig wordt uitgebreid dat personen worden getraind om concreet en 
specifiek te kijken naar negatieve gebeurtenissen niet alleen als ze met henzelf te 
maken hebben maar ook in situaties in de buitenwereld. Deze toevoeging zou in het 
bijzonder van waarde kunnen zijn in de behandeling van personen met kenmerken 
van een borderline persoonlijkheidsstoornis. Een dergelijke aanvulling doet denken 
aan de training van borderline patiënten om een niet oordelende oplettende 
(mindful) houding aan te nemen ten opzichte van gebeurtenissen die met henzelf te 
maken hebben maar ook met de wereld om hen heen, zoals wordt gedaan in 
Linehans dialectische gedragstherapie (1993). Het zou in dit geval echter gaan om 
een meer op de cognities gerichte trainingsmethode. De bevindingen uit dit 
proefschrift geven bovendien aanleiding tot een aanvulling op concreteness 
training waarin patiënten expliciet worden getraind om juist meer te generaliseren 
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naar aanleiding van positieve gebeurtenissen. Met name personen die lijden aan 
een borderline persoonlijkheidsstoornis zouden profiteren van training in 
generalisatie van positieve gebeurtenissen die gebeuren in de wereld om hen heen. 
Veel traditionele behandelmethodes hebben zich exclusief gericht op de afname 
van negativiteit. Cognitieve manipulatiemethodes gericht op toename van positiviteit 
worden vaak verondersteld niet evidence-based te zijn. Dit proefschrift ondersteunt 
echter de toepassing van cognitieve methoden die een positieve overgeneralise-
rende denkstijl stimuleren. Tenslotte, de bevindingen die worden beschreven in dit 
proefschrift suggereren dat het de moeite waard is om te investeren in de 
ontwikkeling en evaluatie van bias modificatie methodes om verschillende combinaties 
te beïnvloeden van overgeneraliserende versus concreet specificerende, op positieve 
gebeurtenissen gerichte versus op negatieve gebeurtenissen gerichte, op het zelf 
gerichte versus op situaties in de buitenwereld gerichte en associatieve versus 
analyserende verwerkingsmodi. Deze bias modificatie methodes kunnen worden 
ingezet als mogelijke interventies die de behandeling kunnen ondersteunen van 
personen die lijden aan een depressie en/of een borderline persoonlijkheidsstoornis.
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van hun scriptie, werkten aan delen van de onderzoeken wil ik bedanken voor hun 
noeste arbeid maar vooral ook voor hun uitdagende vragen en hun aangename 
gezelschap op de akker. Prof. Dr. Arnoud Arntz, prof. Dr. Ko Hummelen en de helaas 
te vroeg overleden prof. Dr. Wim Trijsburg wil ik danken voor hun waardevolle 
adviezen aan het begin van het traject. Verder wil ik mijn verschillende collega- 
onderzoekers en in het bijzonder Dr. Machteld Ouwens en Huib Valkenberg 
bedanken die ik tijdens dit traject ontmoette op de universiteit en met wie ik op 
cruciale momenten lief en leed heb mogen delen. Machteld: de wereld wordt door 
jou een stukje mooier en beter. Huib: hallelujah! Dr. William van der Veld wil ik 
danken voor zijn milde geduld en hulp bij de statistische uitdagingen waarvoor ik 
me gesteld zag. Mijn collega’s bij Scelta en het UMC St. Radboud dank ik voor hun 
geïnteresseerd meeleven, hun uitdagende vragen en hun bereidheid de zorg voor 
mijn patiënten waar te nemen in de weken dat ik dit proefschrift probeerde te 
voltooien. In het bijzonder dank ik Gerard de Roos en Yolanda Huysmans voor hun 
niet-aflatende steun en vertrouwen. Ik dank Niels van de Ven, Ricardo Pengel, Ineke 
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Hospers, Nicole Timan, Minne van Haaren en Remke Smeekens voor hun toewijding 
en kameraadschap iedere dag in ons DGT-team.
Ik heb weleens gelezen dat het niet passend is je (co)promotors in het dankwoord 
te bedanken voor hun werk, steun en oneindig geduld. Bij dezen zal ik dat dan maar 
niet doen. 
Ik dank mijn ouders voor hun steun, hun medeleven en de basis voor het leven die 
ze mij gegeven hebben met hun levenshouding die me telkens weer inspireert om 
als ik iets doe het ook echt goed te willen doen, of dat nou lukt of niet. Ik ben blij 
dat jullie er allebei nog zijn om dit moment met mij te vieren en hoop nog veel 
mooie ogenblikken met jullie te delen.
Als laatste maar zeker niet als minste wil ik Irene bedanken. Ze verrichtt e wonderen 
door ons, door al onze ambiti es, overvolle leven te organiseren en naast haar eigen 
werk en studies mij te helpen onze kinderen Line, Yanna en Ole zo op te voeden dat 
ze de wonderen blijven die ze zijn.
Curriculum Vitae in Dutch
Curriculum Vitae
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CurrICuluM VITAE
Thom van den Heuvel werd op 17 juni 1972 geboren in Sint-Oedenrode. In 1990 
behaalde hij het gymnasium-diploma aan het R.K. Gymnasium Beekvliet te Sint-
Michielsgestel. Hierna studeerde hij psychologie en filosofie aan de Radboud 
Universiteit Nijmegen. Naast zijn studies werkte hij onder andere bij het Studium 
Generale van deze universiteit en was hij voorzitter van Studentenvereniging 
Diogenes. Ten behoeve van zijn afstudeerscriptie deed hij onderzoek in de Praktijk 
voor Persoonlijkheidsstoornissen (nu: Scelta, GGNet) in Apeldoorn. In 1998 studeerde 
hij af in de richting Klinische Psychologie. Snel daarna werd hij aangenomen voor de 
opleiding tot Psychotherapeut BIG. Op basis van zijn afstudeerscriptie waarvoor hij 
de scriptieprijs van de Nederlandse vereniging voor Psychoanalyse had ontvangen, 
formuleerde hij het promotievoorstel dat ten grondslag ligt aan dit proefschrift. 
Als psychotherapeut specialiseerde hij zich in de behandeling van patiënten met 
(borderline) persoonlijkheidsstoornissen en werkte hij bij RIAGG IJsselland in Deventer, 
in de Praktijk voor Persoonlijkheidsstoornissen in Apeldoorn, Scelta Nijmegen en 
het UMC St. Radboud. Vanaf 2007 combineerde hij dit met managementtaken 
zowel bij Scelta Nijmegen als op de afdeling Psychiatrie van het UMC St. Radboud te 
Nijmegen. Naast genoemde taken werkte hij in wisselende snelheid aan de studies 
die in dit proefschrift beschreven zijn. 
Thom van den Heuvel is getrouwd met Irene van den Heuvel-Lensen en is de trotse 
vader van Line, Yanna en Ole.

